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ABSTRACT
Sociologists have observed differences in research 
output among scientists, particularly within academic 
science. Several explanations have been suggested. Of 
these, cumulative advantage attempts to explain these 
differences by stating that if an individual can produce 
significant research at the start of a career, that 
individual will receive increasing increments of rewards 
and resources that will perpetuate that research.
This study tests the cumulative advantage hypothesis 
using data derived from the 1975 Carnegie Council National 
Surveys of Higher Education. The respondents were 
categorized by the year their doctorates were taken and 
whether they were employed at doctoral granting, natural 
science institutions.
Indicators of productivity were objective and 
subjective. The objective indicators included research 
output, outside funding and salaries; the subjective 
indicators included intellectual environment, work habits 
and perceived reputation of the institution. Allison's 
coefficient of variation was then employed to detect 
variation over time of these indicators.
The findings suggest that research productivity is 
related to general features of the society, particularly 
the unequal distribution of resources.
CUMULATIVE ADVANTAGE 
AND SCIENTIFIC PRODUCTIVITY
CHAPTER I
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The purpose of this study is to examine, within the 
context of academic research, the process of cumulative 
advantage. In general terms, cumulative advantage can be 
explained using the words of Jonathan and Stephen Cole 
(1973:72): "In American science, a relatively small
proportion of graduate schools produce a major portion of 
science Ph.D.'s; even fewer produce the scientists who 
will go on to receive recognition". The question, 
therefore, addresses why only a few schools produce only a 
few scientists who do most of the noteworthy research. The 
basic issues of this study will deal with the structure of 
inequality in society, vexing concepts that have provoked 
much acrimony within the social sciences. Since, as 
Marcuse (1964:44) once observed that "...inequality is 
necessitated by genuine social needs, technical
3requirements and the physical and mental differences among 
individuals", we must acknowledge as a preliminary 
assumption that inequality is an omnipresent phenomenon in 
any society.
Beth Vanfossen (1979:19) has noted "...that except for 
the most highly technical and professional occupations, 
education serves more as a credential than as an indicator 
of job performance skills". Academic researchers most 
certainly belong within these highly technical and 
professional occupations, but these researchers are not 
divorced from the society in which they carry out their 
research. We must understand at the onset that, as Jay 
(1973:54) remarked, "all cultural phenomena must be seen as 
mediated through the social totality...". This research 
therefore attempts to examine a social process in terms of 
other processes and structures that coincide with it.
The process of cumulative advantage addresses the 
production of research, the rewards for that research and 
the resources necessary for the production of research. 
Generally, it is believed that those individuals who can, 
at time 1, produce over and above other researchers will 
accumulate more rewards which can be used as or converted 
to resources for the continued production of academic 
research. Thus, over time, fewer researchers will be able 
to produce research of merit; these few researchers have
4accumulated the necessary advantages, or means, that enable 
them to continue with their research. On face value, this 
is apparently the case in that it may provide an 
explanation for the skewed distribution of production, 
resources and rewards.
However, several alternative hypotheses have been 
offered. The Ortega hypothesis suggests that the "...work 
of the average scientist is indispensable if science is to 
advance" (Cole,1970:378). That is, science only progresses 
due to the efforts of many; the few eminent researchers in 
science rely heavily on the majority of the published 
literature, which is substantial— particularly in the hard 
sciences. Cole found that this hypothesis was
questionable, that for the most part, citations of eminent 
scientists were used almost exclusively rather than 
citations of the rank and file in science (Ibid.:400).
The sacred spark hypothesis, according to Allison and 
Stewart (1974:596) "...says simply that there are 
substantial, predetermined differences among scientists in 
their ability and motivation to do creative research". 
Though compelling, this hypothesis fails to acknowledge, 
among other things, the resources necessary for the 
production of research.
The heterogeneity hypothesis, as described by Gaston 
(1978:146), "refers...to the presumed tendencies for
5scientists to be differentially motivated from the 
beginning of their careers". This hypothesis only implies 
rewards and makes no mention of resources. A similar 
hypothesis, dealing with reinforcement, states that 
researchers who are sufficiently rewarded will out-produce 
those who are not rewarded. Again, the issue of resources 
is ignored. It should be noted that Allison (1982:623) has 
refered to the cumulative advantage hypothesis as the 
heterogeneity hypothesis. This connection will be made 
clearer in later chapters. Nevertheless, one should be 
able to see that differential access to resources and 
rewards will produce differences in research productivity.
A variation of the cumulative advantage hypothesis is 
Merton's Matthew effect (1968) and differs from cumulative 
advantage in its focus. Rather than addressing production, 
rewards and resources, the Matthew effect focuses primarily 
on rewards. Nevertheless, Merton's "The Matthew Effect in 
Science" raises a unique spectrum of sensitizing concepts 
that apply to cumulative advantage. For instance, in 
addressing Nobel laureates, Merton (Ibid.:441) notes that 
"...a good number of scientists who have not received the 
prize and will not receive it have contributed as much to 
the advancement of science as some of the recipients, or 
more". On face value, this statement embodies the process 
of the Matthew effect. But probing more deeply, one is
6almost forced to consider why there is such disparity in 
rewards. Rewards are not handed out randomly; someone 
must ostensibly produce something first, which begs the 
issue of resources. Further, one must also consider that 
prestige— however nebulous— is in itself a resource.
More importantly, Merton acknowledges the
dysfunctional aspect of cumulative advantage: "These
social processes of social selection that deepen the 
concentration of top scientific talent create extreme 
difficulties for any efforts to counteract the 
institutional consequences of the Matthew principle in 
order to produce new centers of scientific excellence" 
(Ibid.:458). Further, Merton realistically addresses what 
has become a major underpinning of this study. That is, he 
states that "a macrosocial version of the Matthew principle 
is apparently involved in those processes of social 
selection that currently lead to the concentration of 
scientific resources and talent" (Ibid.:459). This is 
interpreted to mean that inequality in academic science may 
be a function of the processes that generate inequality in 
a society.
What are these processes and to what extent do these 
processes permeate academic research? Ostensibly, there 
must be an underlying normative system that may aid the 
individual in coming to terms with cumulative advantage.
7As Gaston (Ibid.:4) has pointed out,
The norms provide a basis for studying under what 
conditions they are more or less observed and 
what the negative and positive consequences are 
for conformity to or deviance from them. The 
norms thus provide a perspective for analysing 
internal operation of the social system of 
science.
It has been noted that scientific research is dominated by 
universalistic norms (Cole and Cole,op.cit:67; Gaston, 
Ibid., among others), that for the most part, "...requires 
that race, sex, age, religion...or any ascribed 
characteristic should not be involved in any evaluation of 
any scientist's research contribution" (Gaston, Ibid.). 
Yet there appears to be, as this study attempts to bring 
out, a sharp distinction between the real and the ideal. 
In this regard, Zuckerman (1977:250) has pointed out that 
"close examination of the processes involved in the 
accumulation of advantage finds that strict conformity to 
the merit principle in science contributes to marked 
inequalities in scientific performance and rewards". This 
presumably means that past achievements, even though 
meritous, generate inequality— sort of a ripple effect that 
contradicts the meritocracy of science. Yet there appears 
to be an underlying continuity between science and the rest 
of society. Parsons (1951:192) provides further 
elaboration in this regard:
..the strong emphasis on classificatory qualities
8tends, in terms of social structure, to become an 
emphasis on status rather than on specific 
achievement. Hence the inevitable elaborate
differentiation of roles where achievements are 
concretely of high importance and where 
universalistic criteria apply to them, tends to 
work out a status-hierarchy where the accent is 
on what a given actor is^  rather than in what he 
has done.
Consequently, we may assume for the purposes of this study 
that science is, ideally, characterized by the norm of 
universalism. But, in reality, deviations from this ideal 
are in part a function of macro social processes as 
described by Parsons. Science is no more divorced from 
macro structure and process than is any other form of 
social organization. This apparently has been overlooked 
by scholars of cumulative advantage, and as a result, too 
much attention has been focused on individual 
characteristics rather than on macro social forces.
To reiterate, this study seeks to provide further 
elaboration on the process of cumulative advantage, a
process that enables some researchers to produce at a rate 
that exceeds the majority of other researchers. The basic 
hypothesis to be tested states that if cumulative advantage 
operates, then over time there will be increasing
variability of scholarly productivity over time and an an
increase in the variability of access to resources. A
corollary hypothesis states that if cumulative advantage
9operates, then over time institutions will also experience 
increased variability of access to resources.
This study follows the approach used by Allison and 
Stewart (1974) in that a synthetic cohort is examined using 
data from the 1975 Carnegie Council National Surveys of 
Higher Education. Because this survey is not longitudinal, 
it is necessary to infer the effects of time, and hence, 
the necessity of synthetic cohorts. Cohorts were 
established by categorizing the respondents according to
the year the Ph.D. was taken; this resulted in ten
categories. These categories were then sorted into four 
sub-groups ranging from those individuals involved with 
doctoral granting programs in the natural sciences to those 
who are involved in the humanities and the social sciences, 
among others. In this way, it is believed that further
elaboration of cumulative advantage is possible.
It should be noted that virtually all studies of 
cumulative advantage have had difficulties in obtaining 
pertinent data. As Gaston (Ibid.:146) pointed out, "the 
most serious problem is in obtaining data that bear
directly on the process and that can be used to rule out 
alternative explanations". Accordingly, this study must 
make use of synthetic cohorts rather than the preferred 
longitudinal data.
This study will proceed with a review of the
10
literature, citing recent research concerning cumulative 
advantage. Following the review of the literature, 
methodological considerations are discussed. Analysis of 
the findings are then reviewed, followed by conclusions and 
implications.
Again, the basic question for this effort is whether a 
case can be made for the existence of a process that 
contradicts the scientific community's norm of
universalism. Further, it will be argued that cumulative 
advantage is a function of the distribution of resources in 
academic research, from which flows the research itself and 
any subsequent rewards. In this way we might be able to 
better specify the question of whether cumulative advantage 
is a function of the recognition of a researcher's early 
efforts, or whether other factors more adequately explain 
why inequality exists in academic research.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The available literature on cumulative advantage, 
bibliometrics aside, are, for the most part, quite recent. 
Price (1963, cited in Cole,1970:379), noted the apparent 
discrepency between active scientists and the highly skewed 
distribution of discoveries and publications: Only a very
few of all scientists were responsible for about half of 
the total of all publications. No mention is made, 
however, concerning the access by these scientists to 
resources, rewards or to one another (Cole, Ibid.).
Merton (1968), in his seminal article "The Matthew 
Effect in Science", cites the works of Glaser (1964), 
Hagstrom (1965), Storer (1966), among others, in addressing 
the question of why increasing recognition leads to 
increasing productivity. Merton acknowledges the 
overlapping of the ideal and the actual, processual and
12
structural when noting that "there is...a continuing
interplay between the status system, based on honor and 
esteem, and the class system, based on differential
life-chances, which locates scientists in differing 
positions within the opportunity structure of science" 
(Ibid.:445). Rather than focusing on the whys and
wherefores of inequality, Merton elaborates on the 
functional implications of the Matthew effect, e.g. its 
effects in relation to communication and social and
psychological processes within American science. He does 
note, however, that "when the Matthew effect
is... transformed into an idol of authority, it violates the 
norm of universalism embodied in the institution of science 
and curbs the advancement of knowledge" (Ibid.:457). That 
is, unless an academician has attained at least some 
renown, it may be quite difficult to have a piece of work 
accepted for publication as Merton (Ibid.), citing Barber, 
demostrates so trenchantly. Though Merton chooses to 
develop the functional implications of the Matthew effect, 
he nevertheless acknowledges its overall implications in 
conclusion by stating that: "A macrosocial version of the
Matthew principle is apparently involved in those processes 
of social selection that currently lead to the 
concentration of scientific resources and talent" 
(Ibid.:459).
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Cole (1970) addressed cumulative advantage by asking 
whether science advances due to the efforts of many or to 
the efforts of a few (Ibid.:378). Though implicit in his 
work, it can be said that if cumulative advantage was not 
the case in scholarly production, then the work of noted 
scientists would cite a preponderance of "mediocre" work. 
That is, the great advances in science are a result of the 
work of many as employed by those who make the great 
discoveries. In other words, "what are the intellectual 
sources of influence on the production of scientific 
research of varying quality?" (Ibid.:380). If all 
scientists, controlling for quality, contributed to the 
reservoir of knowledge then their work should be cited by 
other scientists, regardless of stature. Cole found that 
this was not the case, noting in his study that 
"...regardless of...[a scientist's hierarchical] location, 
[they tend to] use to a disproportionate degree the work of 
[other] eminent scientists" (Ibid.:399). Further, and 
perhaps more significantly, Cole states that "...the data 
indicate that most research is rarely ever used by the bulk 
of the physics community, and even more sparingly used by 
the most eminent scientists who produce the most 
significant discoveries" (Ibid.:400). Cole closes by 
noting the contradiction that arises within the scientific 
community between equalitarian norms and reality. He notes
14
that science is indeed highly stratified, but does not 
address, to any extent, the issues of why science is highly 
stratified.
Hargens and Hagstrom (1967) note the contradiction in 
science between equalitarianism and the stratification that 
exists within science, particularly in regards to rewards, 
i.e., prestige and material resources. Further, the 
prestige of any given university can be seen as a form of 
the contradiction between the norm of universalism and 
numerous particularistic norms that define the quality of 
any given academician's work. This is especially evident 
in regards to the rewards accrued by an individual who, not 
having proven him or herself, is nevertheless rewarded as a 
result of that person's "certification" (Faia,1981), the 
institution where the highest degree was received. 
Consequently, the authors attempted to assess the impact of 
certification on the distribution of rewards in academic 
research. They found a "...surprisingly weak relationship 
between the prestige of a scientist's doctoral institution 
and his productivity rate" (Ibid.:30), r=.06. They
concluded by noting "...that the identification of a 
scientist with his doctoral institution does have an effect 
upon his placement within the academic stratification 
system...” (Ibid.:35, r=.33). Hargens and Hagstrom
reconcile these findings, in part, to the fact that only
15
physical and biological scientists were sampled for this 
study; and, that "...38 in the highest prestige category 
had positions in graduate institutions at the time of the 
study as compared to 28 from graduate schools in the lowest 
prestige category..." (Ibid.:30-1). Further, they suggest 
that "...Turner's notion of contest mobility corresponds 
rather closely to the 'ideal' process of status 
determination...while the notion of sponsored mobility
resembles the real life departures from the ideal..."
(Ibid.:36). This suggests that investigations into 
cumulative advantage must make a closer examination at the 
processes characterized as being either ideal or actual, 
contest or sponsored mobility. The problem arises, 
however, in identifying the essence of cumulative
adavantage. Is it the ideal— contest mobility— or 
otherwise— sponsored mobility, or both? Since social 
phenomena are rarely, if ever, an issue of "A causes B", it 
would seem that in order to study cumulative advantage, 
one's data source must go beyond institution of Ph.D., 
productivity, resources, etc. Indicators must be included 
that demonstrate to what extent the ideal and reality
converge, if at all. Specifying a preponderance of one or 
the other would surely be an indicator of what factors make 
cumulative advantage operate.
Though the Hargens and Hagstrom study did not address
16
cumulative advantage, per se, it appears that this process 
is not set off at the time a new Ph.D begins his or her 
career. This study suggests that cumulative advantage 
takes into account social factors, i.e., socioeconomic 
status, that carry over into one's profession. After all, 
cumulative advantage is a process, and since nothing occurs 
in isolation, the cumulative advantage process may be just 
that— a process of cumulation over one's life. Further, it 
may even be suggested that the contradiction between the 
ideal and reality in academia reflects a contradiction that 
exists within society generally.
Jonathan and Stephen Cole (1973) addressed the issue 
of the ethic of universalism and its connection with 
cumulative advantage; and, the ways in which the 
self-fulfilling prophecy may influence the process of 
cumulative advantage. They suggest that those graduate 
students labelled as bright and promising are given 
preferential treatment over and above those students 
unfortunate enough to be labelled otherwise. Access to 
resources allow these students to out-perform their peers. 
They suggest that those graduate students labelled as 
bright and promising may be given more attention than 
students labelled otherwise. This labeling process may, 
over time, allow the "bright" students, through the 
auspices of their mentors, greater access to any necessary
17
resources. As the Coles state (Ibid.:238): "The personal
history of most Nobelists testifies to this process". Or 
as Faia (1982) noted, the process is one of social 
selection through positive feedback.
The Coles pursue this issue by attempting to 
disentangle the labelling process by which a student is 
labelled either "bright" or "pedestrian", noting 
differences in I.Q., Graduate Record Examination scores and 
the intuitive attraction of professors in selecting under­
studies. Unfortunately, they fail to consider other
factors that may influence a student^s "brightness". In 
addressing brightness, it is essential that we ask why it 
is that "the erosion of our inborn creativity begins early 
and continues throughout our lives" (Raudsepp,1979:4). 
Social factors must be considered in addressing this issue; 
however, the Coles do not begin to acknowledge this
factor— a point that may be an indicator of the elitism
which apparently accompanies analysis of a stratification 
system from within that system. However, the issue of 
labelling and the self-fulfilling prophecy may provide
implicit answers to the above questions. The Coles do 
acknowledge that:
The labelling process is probably more likely to
have a negative effect on mediocre students. If
we consider two mediocre students—  one labelled
18
as '’bright' and the other as 'pedestrian'— the 
former is likely to develop greater
self-confidence and more likely to sustain the 
motivation that is required to become an even 
run-of-the-mill research scientist (Ibid.:241).
The Coles also addressed the issue concerning an 
individual's location within the social structure of 
science. For instance (and in accord with Hargens and 
Hagstrom), they state that "graduates of top-ranking 
doctoral departments are slightly more likely than 
graduates of less prestigious institutions to get better 
first academic jobs" (Ibid.:242). The bottom line to the 
process of cumulative advantage is apparently who gets the 
most prestige/recognition. Further, it is a function of 
processes that raise questions more fundamental than
inequality in science. It is a function of inequality 
generally. And even though this inequality is not a result 
of some diabolical plan, we must nevertheless consider, or 
at least acknowledge fundamental issues. The Coles barely 
do this; they merely acknowledge the contradiction between 
the ideal and reality in science. But in so doing, they
state the matter in such a way as to render it the lesser
of two evils. One should note, though, that the lesser of 
two evils is always evil.
Zuckerman's (1977) classic study, The Scientific
Elite, also corroborates the findings previously cited. 
She notes that cumulative advantage "...has scientists who
19
show promise early in their careers being given greater 
opportunities in the way of research training and 
facilities" (Ibid.:248). It should be noted, as her title 
indicates, that her subject matter is Nobel laureates. 
Though insights into the process of cumulative advantage 
can be derived from this work, it nevertheless deals with 
only the pinnacle of the stratification system in science. 
But as Zuckerman (Ibid.:249) notes, her "...composite 
portrait of the laureates' careers seems to square rather 
well with the model suggested by the accumulation of 
advantage: the spiraling of augmented achievements and
rewards for individuals and a system of stratification that 
is sharply graded". To her credit, Zuckerman notes that 
overemphasis on evaluating one's efforts according to the 
merit of that work "...contributes to marked inequalities 
in scientific performance and rewards" (Ibid.:250). Again, 
the issues of self-selection, labelling, sponsorship and 
organizational factors are considered in terms of their 
effect on the accumulation of advantages. But as in other 
studies, there is a failure to consider more fundamental 
issues; and, a failure to take a different approach into 
the whys and wherefores of cumulative advantage. Instead 
of probing into these issues, Zuckerman chooses to question 
those factors that place a damper on cumulative advantage.
Zuckerman feels that these factors include the
20
psychological impact of success, limitations on upward 
mobility, access to resources, noblesse oblige and other 
micro and macro processes ( I b i d 252-3). The direction 
taken by Zuckerman, though perfectly valid, is not one that 
examines the emergence of cumulative advantage— which 
apparently is taken as a given— but one that looks at its
end results in conjunction with those who reap the maximum
benefits.
Gaston's interpretation (1977) of cumulative advantage 
acknowledges the basic premise that the need for resources 
which is applicable to the nuclear physicist as well as the 
"pencil and paper" theorist (Ibid.:145). Unfortunately, 
Gaston sees nothing inherently inequitable about cumulative 
advantage: "Nothing about cumulative advantage necessarily
means it is inequitable" (Ibid.:145). In the opinion of
this study, it is felt that this is simply not the case. 
It does not mattter how justly resources and rewards are 
recieved or how wisely used. The fact remains that some 
receive while others do not; the issue must be 
acknowledged as of one of inequity and involves the 
circumstances of its emergence.
But, as Gaston notes, this may be more a factor of the 
inability to specify empirical indicators than in asking 
the right questions:
21
But in spite of...[cumulative advantage] being 
generally well understood, little attention has 
been given to dealing empirically with the 
process, and what has been done is less than 
satisfying...The most serious problem is in
obtaining data that bear directly on the process 
and that can be used definitely to rule out
alternative explanations.
The issue, Gaston suspects, is further confounded by other
hypotheses such as reenforcement and heterogeneity and the
issue of access to data concerning researcher's access to
resources.
Using longitudinal data rather than cross-sectional
data, Gaston mimmics other studies without addressing the
issue of resources. Apparently Gaston feels that abstract 
counts provides an adequate, though indirect indicator of 
productivity.
In order to measure differences in productivity, 
Gaston used a variation of the coefficent of variation; 
this was done by dividing a sample's variance (rather than 
its standard deviation) by the sample's mean. According to 
Gaston, "dividing the variance by the mean has the effect 
of reducing the measure and makes it somewhat more 
conservative, but it also standardizes the statistic so 
that comparisons are appropriate" (Ibid.:148). Dividing 
his sample into eight cohorts, basing them on year last 
degree was taken, Gaston's data demonstrated that as 
scientists go through their career, "...their inequality or 
variability [in terms of production] steadily increases"
22
(Ibid.:149). Gaston notes that since he lacked the data on 
resources, he could not make a direct test of cumulative 
advantage, nor could he rule out alternative hypotheses, 
i.e., heterogeneity. But when one considers the issue of 
prestige in accord with the previous studies, particularly 
at the beginning of the career, one wonders whether 
resources may have as strong an effect on cumulative 
advantage than is presently believed.
Part of the reason for Gaston's use of a modified 
version of the coefficient of variation and longitudinal 
data arises from the efforts of Allison and Stewart (1974) 
and Faia (1975). Allison and Stewart used cross-sectional 
data on chemists, covering citation counts for a five year 
period. The authors were forced to use synthetic cohorts 
due to the absence of true cohort data. Basing their 
measures of inequality on the Gini index, they were able to 
show that inequality in publication and citation counts 
increased with age increases of cohort members. However, 
as previously noted by Gaston, the variance was used as an 
indicator of inequality— a statistic that does not indicate 
relative variability (Blalock,1979:84;Snedecor and 
Cochran,1967:62-3).
Faia noted the problem inherent to cross-sectional 
data analysis: "it is impossible to vary age without
varying cohort membership, and vice-versa" (1975:825).
23
Because Faia had access to a much larger data source 
(American Council on Education survey data, N=53029), he 
attempted a replication of the procedures used by Allison 
and Stewart, noting as mentioned, the perils of using 
cross-sectional data analysis (but not the variance). 
Correlations for field and productivity "...were somewhat 
more commensurable with those of Allison and Stewart...: 
.47 for social scientists; .42 for humanities professors; 
.02 for biologists and .68 for physical scientists" 
(Ibid.:826). More crucial, perhaps, than anything else is 
Faia's notion (Ibid.:828) concerning "...the importance of 
gaining statistical control over the variety of independent 
variables which could be introduced under the 
'heterogeneity' rubric...[and that] concepts such as 
'productivity', 'esteem', and 'access to resources' subsume 
a wide variety of phenomena amenable to study using both 
non-experimental and experimental techniques". With the 
exception of Cole (1970), these "amenable concepts" do not 
seem to have been given thorough consideration
(Reskin,1977:501;Gaston,1978:146,149) .
Knorr, Mittermier, Aichholzer and Weller (1979) sought 
to shed additional light on cumulative advantage by 
examining intraorganizational variables (Ibid.:57). They 
base their approach on the premise that "...scientists may 
be affected more by organizational settings and structures
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than is usually emphasized in stratification studies" 
(Ibid.)* It is argued that hierarchical position may be a 
significant factor in cumulative advantage by virtue of the 
power and resources that accompanies advancement in rank 
and that the issue becomes one of ease of productivity 
rather than "intriquing referees and publishing companies 
toward publication of whatever is submitted by a
high-status scientist" (Ibid.:57-8). But as Knorr, et al., 
present their approach in their introduction, it becomes 
immediately apparent that, regardless of the techniques 
employed, their effort will be similar in nature to other 
studies of cumulative advantage. To use their own words: 
"The relationship between age and productivity found in 
previous studies would then have to be discussed in the 
light of the association between a scientists age and the 
position he or she has attained in his organizational 
environment" (Ibid.:58). Their approach is well taken, but 
it seems quite apparent that as age increases, so too will 
hierarchical position. Knorr, et al., see this and
consequently attempt "...to explore whether age can be a 
proxy for the position a scientist has attained in a
research organization" (Ibid.). More importantly, they 
seek to find whether a relationship exists between
structural position— a function of age— and "...task 
structures that may be conducive to a high quantity of
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output..." (Ibid.). As was previously noted, if 
cumulative advantage holds, then over time some, but not 
all researchers will out produce other researchers over 
time. Though structural position says nothing concerning 
how that position was achieved, it nevertheless implies 
that that position was achieved over time, perhaps as a 
function of the resources available to each respective
position. If structural position denotes access to
resources, and hence, greater productivity, then support 
can be made for the increasing variability of production 
that occurs over time— tentative evidence for the existence 
of the process of cumulative advantage.
Their findings suggested two explanations. First, 
they suggest
..that the status of a scientist significantly 
affects the quantity of publications he or she 
can claim, irrespective of his or her personal 
innovativeness and productivity. The second 
interpretation would describe differential 
capability and technical competence of a 
scientist, deriving the higher productivity of
higher position scientists from a movement of
more capable and higher-performing researchers 
into supervisory positions (Ibid.:87).
But in considering the second explanation, one is forced to
confront the Coles' (op. cit.:73) statement that "...in
the business world, people rise to their level of
incompetence. In science, people sink to their level of
competence". Though apparently contradictory, their
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hypotheses were verified by their data, e.g., "...staff 
size and volume of projects together account for almost all 
the variance of the unit head's publications..." 
(Ibid.:87-8). The most significant flaw was the failure of 
their data to include measures of "original productive 
capacities"; perhaps we may infer that this capacity is 
not as significant as other factors when taking into 
consideration the Hargens and Hagstrom study. Further, the 
Knorr, et al. study provides an interesting twist in 
studies of cumulative advantage in that it does not 
consider quality of production as an indicator of that 
process. Rather, cumulative advantage may be perpetuated 
by upward mobility that allows increased access to human 
and material resources that may lead to increases in 
publication rates.
Reskin (1977) begins her study by noting that even 
though science is apparently progressing, most individual 
academic scientists do not actively engage in research 
(Ibid.:492). Her data were analyzed longitudinally rather 
than cross-sectionally consisting of randomly selected Ph. 
D.'s qualified to do research. Measures of inequality were 
provided using the Gini index. Her findings demonstrated 
"pronounced inequality in article productivity"
(Ibid.:495). However, because her data covered an eleven 
year period, her findings could not discern any
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fluctuations in this inequality over time (Ibid.:496). In 
addition, Reskin was unable to test the cumulative 
advantage hypothesis because she lacked data on her 
sample's access to or control of resources. She does claim 
that decade context, i.e., work location, provides a 
"crude" indicator of resources, noting that those subjects 
who remained within the university setting for the entire 
decade were less productive than those who moved into the 
university environment during the same decade (Ibid.). In
this regard, Reskin (Ibid.:502) notes that:
The effect of organizational context points to 
the role of organization's specific reward 
structures and is consistent with the
accumulation of advantages...However, if context 
only affected performance in this way, its impact 
should disappear while scientists change 
employment settings. The enduring effect of 
beginning one's career in a university may 
reflect on-the-first-job continuation of
predoctoral socialization.
Reskin closes by calling for further investigation into the
nature of scientific norms, particularly negative sanctions
such as publish or perish. But since her statistical
findings were at best modest, and since there appears to be
too much ambiquity in regards to negative sanctions, it
would appear that more exploratory analyses are needed
before the effect of norms can be thoroughly analyzed.
Long's (1978) study asked whether structural position
affects the productivity of researchers within academia.
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Productivity was operationalized utilizing publications and 
citations such that the following hypotheses could be 
tested: "Prestigious departments select more productive
scientists...[and] a more prestigious department 
facilitates greater productivity..." (Ibid.:890). Using 
longitudinal data, Long traced the movement of scientists 
from graduate school to the first employing department and 
any movement from one department to another. His analysis 
allowed him to conclude that a person's productivity did 
not have quite the effect on being hired by a prestigious 
department as did graduate education, sponsorship, or 
post-doctoral fellowships (Ibid.). Concluding, Long notes 
that:
Substantively our findings call for a
reconsideration of operation of the reward system 
in the scientific career...Advantage accumulates 
not to those who have been successful at time 1, 
but to those who have received the advantage of a 
prestigious position for reasons independent of 
their productivity at time 1 (Ibid.:905).
In other words, where does the process of cumulative
advantage begin? Long seems to suggest that it does not
begin once the job has been taken. The data must (if
available) be examined longitudinally if one is to answer
the above question. Long's findings also give further
support to the notion that the scientific stratification
system, at least for newcomers, is marked by elitism. To
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what extent does universalism apply in this system? It 
would appear that universalism is relative to the prestige 
of one's training and the prestige of the first department 
to hire, and that universalism is not characteristic of the 
entire scientific system. It seems that universalism 
operates within each stratum in science, but not across. 
Universalism gives way to particularism and vice versa. 
That is, if such a thing as social structure does exist, 
then the component parts of that structure must contain 
processes that are unique to those components. One need 
only to consider the "culture of poverty" with middle-class 
culture to see this point. Further, we are dealing in this 
instance with specifics, rather than generalities.
The Allison, Long and Krauze (1982) study is perhaps 
the most definitive study to date concerning the existence 
of cumulative advantage. They note that "even if all the 
causal links in the cumulative advantage process were 
confirmed, it would remain an open question whether the end 
result was an appreciable change in the distribution of 
productivity and rewards" (Ibid.:616). In this particular 
study, Allison, et al. note the deficiencies of past 
studies , in particular the measures of inequality used and 
the problem of obtaining true cohort data. In regards to 
the inequality measure, Allison (1980), uses a modified 
version of the coefficient of variation (to be discussed in
30
the following chapter). Allison (Ibid.) has noted that 
although his modified measure "...is not scale invariant 
for the observed number of publications, it i_s^ scale 
invariant for...the latent rate of publication". Which is 
to say that this measure takes into account purely random 
factors, e.g., awaiting the publication of submitted 
papers. In regards to cohorts, Allison, et al. were able 
to obtain true cohort data. Consequently, they were able 
to test the hypothesis "...that inequality of publications 
and citations increases with professional age" (1982:616).
Generally, they were able to confirm this hypothesis; 
they found "...a strong tendency for inequality to increase 
with professional age" (Ibid.:617). This inequality, 
however, indicated publications, but not citation counts. 
Though citation means and standard deviations increased 
together over time, the inequality measure indicated 
little, if any inequity over time, which, in this 
particular case, disconfirmed other explanations that 
purported the precise opposite. Of interest here is the 
statement that these citation findings suggest "...that the 
differentiation is immediate and relatively
constant...[over time] (Ibid.:618; my emphasis). This 
suggests that the findings of the Long and Hargens and 
Hagstrom studies may offer significant insights into this 
question. That is, it may be that the prestige a newcomer
31
brings to the job may have a significant impact on 
continuance of that prestige, given that publications are 
forthcoming. Further, the authors go on to say that "while 
these results are unambiguous, it is difficult to explain 
how there can be an increase in inequality of publications 
without a corresponding increase in the inequality of 
citations to those publications" (Ibid.). Given that this 
study dealt with chemists and biochemists, Allison et al. 
apparently failed to consider the elitist nature of the 
stratification system in science. Recalling Cole's (1970) 
work on physicists, it would appear that only a small 
percentage of any given scientific discipline can be 
considered as that discipline's "heavy-weights", and since 
Allison, et al. do not specify whether their sample
contains any of these "heavy-weight" scientists, then it 
would seem likely that citation counts would not increase 
over time unless we were in fact dealing with eminent
scientists within this study's sample. Demonstrating the 
existence of cumulative advantage is one thing; but, once 
demonstrated, one must also be prepared to address
substantive issues that may explain, in whole or in part, 
what social forces contribute to the emergence or the
perpetuation of that process.
Finally, we must consider the work of Goldstone 
(1979). In a rather brief article, Goldstone addresses
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general issues that offer insights into cumulative 
advantage. This process, I assume, is not a phenomenon 
unique only to science, generally speaking. It appears 
that processes in a society are not bound to any one 
specific environment. Specifics would, obviously, vary, 
but the overall flavor of a process would surely be quite 
similar across society. As Goldstone (Ibid.:389) observed: 
"Frequently in cinema, in sports, in literature, and in 
politics, established performers receive a disproportionate 
amount of attention— and rewards— relative to talented 
newcomers still on the way up". By establishing an 
understanding of the reward system in a given society 
generally, we will be in a much better position to grapple
j
with reward systems specifically. Further, Goldstone also 
noted that "...individuals seeking rewards from the 
performance of other individuals will tend to focus their 
attention on those individuals who are already established 
as being rewarded performers" (Ibid.). I do not think it 
inappropriate to suggest that processes in academic 
research are a reflection of the rest of the society of 
which that research is a part.
All of the studies reviewed were concerned with 
cumulative advantage or with certain aspects of that 
process. Regardless of the methodology used, there is 
consistent support for the existence of this process.
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Specifically, this is a process that finds certain 
individuals producing more in the way of research 
publications, over time, as compared to the rest of that 
discipline.
However, there does not appear to be much consensus of 
interpretation. This may be more a function of the level 
of analysis used than the overall interpretation by any one 
researcher. Ostensibly, cumulative advantage is a process; 
to understand process, we must also consider structure and 
culture. Further, we can analyze this process on the 
individual or structural levels. Since there does not 
appear to be any consensus on establishing a link between 
purely individual and purely structural factors, there will 
necessarily be conflict over interpretation. For the most 
part, the literature reviewed here dealt with individual 
factors, i.e., prestige of doctorate, rewards received, 
etc. Organizational factors dealt essentially with 
contextual variables. But only the non-empirical 
articles— Merton and Goldstone— addressed the issue of 
general implications of the effects of society at large on 
the process of cumulative advantage.
The compiled evidence concerning cumulative advantage 
has resulted in refinements of methodological issues that 
have greatly clarified the measurement of this process, the 
strongest of which appears to be Allison's modified
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coefficient of variation. Longitudinal data, rather than 
synthetic cohort data has reduced much ambiguity. Yet, 
these procedures may be sacrificed, given the empirical 
similarities of studies using both longitudinal and 
synthetic cohort data.
Therefore, the key issue appears to be interpreting 
cumulative advantage rather than merely demonstrating its 
existence. Approaching this issue as one set within a 
context of "open boundaries" (Dubin,1978), should offer a 
more complete interpretation. One marked by consensus— to 
a greater degree than presently exists.
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
The hypothesis to be tested in this study states that 
if cumulative advantage operates, then there will exist, 
over time, increasing variability of productivity in 
academic research. This hypothesis was generated from the 
studies previously cited; further, the variables used in 
this study are, for the most part, similar in nature to 
those variables used in the cited literature. The 
variables to be used follow those of Hargens and Hagstrom 
(1967), Cole (1970), Hagstrom (1971), Allison and Stewart 
(1974), Faia (1975), Long (1978), and Allison, Long and 
Krause (1982). The model used by Allison, et al. has 
served as the basis for the model used in this study.
The 1975 Carnegie Council National Surveys of Higher 
Education (Roizen, Fulton and Trow) provided the variables 
used in this research. This survey drew their respondents
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_rom the 1969 Carnegie Commission Survey, the 1973-4 U.S. 
Office of Education, the 1974 Higher Education Division, 
the 1975 College Blue Book (15th.ed.), the 1973 American 
Universities ans Colleges(llth.ed.), and the 1971 American 
Junior Colleges(8th.ed.) (Ibid.:10). The samples for the 
1975 survey were two-stage stratified samples. Stratifying 
the sample decreases sample estimate variance, permits 
variation of sampling methods between stratum and ensures 
adequate representation of sub-populations (Ibid.:12; 
Babbie,1973:94). Stratification of the sample was based on 
the following criteria: Institutional type, quality and
control; participation in the 1969 survey and 
institutional size; and, racial and ethnic tradition 
(Ibid.:12-3).
Institutional type refers to the distinctions between 
univeristies, four year and two year colleges. Quality of 
an institution was based on the the 1967 Gourman 
Report(universities and colleges) and the 1967 College 
Rater (colleges); quality was indicated by placement into 
high, medium and low categories. Control of an institution 
represented public (federal, state and local) or private 
(Ibid.:14). Eligibility for an instituion's sampling in 
the 1969 survey allowed for comparisons between surveys; 
and, it served as a check for schools opened or closed 
after completion of the 1969 survey. Size was indicated by
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the number of faculty, which also served to eliminate 
schools that were too small (Ibid.:15-6). Thus, the strata 
were comprised of high, medium and low quality universities 
and colleges that were either major strata (participated in 
the 1969 survey), or minor strata (new institutions and 
those not covered in the 1969 survey); this resulted in 
thirty-seven strata for the responding faculty members.
The sampling procedure was, as mentioned, broken down 
into two stages. A simple random sampling procedure was 
sed to select institutions from each stratum discussed 
above; 433 institutions were sampled for faculty members 
(Ibid.:21). These institutions supplied the necessary data 
from which the second stage of the sampling procedure could 
be accomplished. The second stage involved the selection 
of names from lists received from the 433 institutions.
Since it was impossible to ensure that every member of 
the sampling universe had an equal chance of selection, and 
since the response rate was not 100 percent, weighting 
procedures were required for each responding institution 
and faculty member. As before, the weighting was 
accomplished in two stages. Estimating the total possible 
respondents for each stratum allowed the number of actual 
respondents to be multiplied by a factor that would make 
their number equal to the possible total (Ibid.:44). 
Further, this weighting factor was adjusted to allow for
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non-respondents. These procedures, therefore, allowed for 
"stratum-weighting”.
The second weighting stage had to compensate for 
"...differences in response rates between institutions in 
the same stratum" (Ibid.). As Roizen, et al. note, "as a 
result of all these operations, weights for future analyses 
were generated for every school and attached to each 
respondent within that school” (Ibid.:45).
Using SPSS procedure CONDESCRIPTIVE on the weighting 
factor variable, it was revealed that for 24961 
respondents, weights for each individual ranged from a 
minimum of .124 to a maximum of 17.533, with a mean of
1.515 and a standard deviation of 1.775.
The 1975 survey, therefore, provided the necessary 
variables to test the basic hypothesis that if cumulative 
advantage operates, then there will exist, over time, 
increasing variability of productivity in academic 
research, rewards and resources. In addition, subsidiary
hypotheses will be examined: If cumulative advantage
operates, then prestigious institutions will out-produce 
the non-prestigious institutions. Likewise, the
variability of productivity will increase more rapidly for 
the non-scientific disciplines than for the scientific
disciplines•
In testing these hypotheses, twelve variables were
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selected. Articles recently published (LATEPUBL) and total 
articles published (ARTPUBL), were used as indicators of 
productivity (Allison and Stewart,1974; Faia,1975; 
Allison, et al.,1982). Books were not used because, as 
Hagstrom (1971:380) points out: "The production of books,
especially textbooks, is less valued and is not as highly 
related to departmental prestige". Further, it would seem 
that books are not on the cutting edge of research, as is 
the case with articles.
These questions were constructed as follows:
How many articles have you published in academic or 
professional journals? (ARTPUBL):
Responses ranged from zero to over twenty in six 
categories.
How many of your professional writings have been 
published or accepted for publication in the last two 
years? (LATEPUBl TT
Response categories ranged from zero to over ten in 
five categories.
Direct indicators of resources include federal 
(SUPFED), state (SUPSTATE), foundations (SUPFOUND), and 
industry (SUPINDUST). Ostensibly, money is not the only 
resource; but, it is perhaps the most important 
(Blau,1973). These variables were constructed as follows:
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In the past 12 months, did you (or your project) 
recieve research support from [federal, state, 
foundation, or industry] (GRANTS):
Responses were dichotomous: yes or no.
Because these variables are dichotomous, transformation 
into a continuous variable were required. This was
accomplished using SPSS procedures COMPUTE and IF. The new 
variable GRANTS was created utilizing the COMPUTE 
procedure; its value was set at zero. Following the 
COMPUTE, IF cards were used to give grants a value range of 
zero to four. See appendix A for a description of these 
procedures.
It would appear that production of articles, given the 
quality, would be the best indicator of academic 
productivity. But production is only one aspect of the 
cumulative advantage process. Prestige, recognition, and 
access to resources also comprise this process; they are 
not so easily amenable to measurement. However, by relying 
on the general literature concerning inequality and
stratification, one might be able to formulate measures, 
though inferential, of these aspects of cumulative 
advantage.
Prestige and recognition are assumed in this study to
be the principle forms of rewards. One could very well
argue that money, i.e., salaries and cash prizes, are also
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rewards (Gaston,1978:1). This may be the case, but in
regards to cumulative advantage, they will be considered as
resources. Further, it appears that financial
rewards— given salaries— are not the most common form of
reward in science, particularly academic science, and that
recognition and the prestige it brings is as equally
important as are the more tangible forms of rewards.
An epistemological question arises in regards to
prestige and recognition: Does the prestige of one's
background and training set off early recognition, or does
recognition resulting from one's scholarly efforts lead to
prestige, or both? Hargens and Hagstrom (1967), among
others, found that prestige of background, i.e., reputation
of graduate school, has a strong impact on a person's early
career and the recognition accorded that person. But what
of "late-bloomers", those who produce notable work well
into their careers? What are the factors, both micro and
macro, individual and structural, that impacts on a
person's life such that he or she becomes the late-bloomer?
As Merton (1960:428) remarked:
I think it likely that the bias toward precocity 
in our educational and other institutions...has 
notably different consequences for people in 
different social classes. The potential late 
bloomers in the lower economic strata are more
apt to lose out altogether than their
counterparts in the middle and upper strata...The 
potential late bloomers among the well-to-do have 
a better prospect of belated recognition...By
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remaining in the system, they can eventually come 
to view. But many of their more numerous 
counterparts in the lower strata are probably 
lost for good.
The issue is a difficult one; therefore, this study will
consider the issue only in terms of the previously
mentioned hypothesis— that cumulative advantage is
concerned with the increasing variablility in production
from the start of a cohort's career. To do otherwise would
perhaps go beyond the scope of this study.
In order to understand the nature of occupational
prestige in science, we must first understand its nature in
society generally. As Vanfossen (1979:231) notes:
..occupational prestige inequality is a highly 
patterned and stable component of social 
stratification in general. It is not ephemeral 
or elusive, but, rather, is well entrenched and 
pervasive. Further, it is highly correlated with 
economic and educational inequality.
Concerning educational attainment and cumulative advantage,
the stratified nature of elite versus non—elite schools may
offer an additional insight into prestige and science.
Domhoff (1967:77) has stated that "the control of America's
leading universities by members of the American business
aristocracy is more direct than with any other institution
which they control". This necessarily implies that these
"leading institutions" will receive more substantial
resources, resources that are necessary to conduct
research, among other activities. And if the nature of an
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institution, e.g., highly prestigious, highly productive, 
is contingent on the resources it receives, and if the 
depth of research is contingent on outside funds, then 
cumulative advantage is, inpart, a function of who gets 
what, why, when and how.
Consequently, by selecting those institutions defined 
in the 1975 survey as being high quality, differences in 
the variability of production and access to resources 
should be less for these institutions than for institutions 
considered high quality. However, since most, if not all 
of the literature on cumulative advantage deals with the 
hard sciences, the faculty in the 1975 survey were broken 
down not only into high and low quality institutions, but 
also into natural science disciplines and all others. 
Cumulative advantage should be more pronounced within the 
natural sciences than without. If this is not the case, 
then perhaps a case can be made against the centrality of 
production in cumulative advantage. The question might 
therefore shift from production per se to those factors 
that are conducive to production, e.g., reputation and 
outside funding. That is, production may very well be 
merely a necessary rather than a sufficient indicator of 
cumulative advantage.
A case can also be made for the environment that 
greater resources may stimulate, particularly in regards to
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the higher quality institutions. As Blau (Ibid.: 257-8)
has pointed out:
[An]...institutional resource is the academic 
climate in a university or college, that is, the 
predominant orientation to academic work among 
colleagues. The utilization of economic 
resources to offer sufficient salaries to recruit 
good faculties has a 'snowball effect' on the 
scholarly research being carried out in an 
academic institution...[This] not only...[raises] 
the scholarly quality of individual faculty 
members, but thereby also create[s] an academic 
climate in the institution that spurs research 
efforts. The scholary research of individual 
faculty members depends to a considerable extent 
on the colleague climate in their institution.
It might be suggested, then, that the prestige of an
institution, as a result of inequality generally, produces
internal resources as well as attracting resources from
outside sources.
Consequently, several variables from the 1975 survey
have been incorporated into this study that may approximate
academic tradition that is conducive to scholarly
productivity. These include:
How would you rate...the academic reputation of your 
department outside your institution (DEPREP):
Responses ranged from excellent to poor in four 
categories.
How would you______ rate. . .the______ intellectual
environement...at your institution (INTEL):
Responses ranged from excellent to poor in four 
categories.
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How would you rate...the intellectual environment... in 
your department (INTENV):
Responses ranged from excellent to poor in four 
categories.
Since research cannot be carried out solely on the 
basis of reputation and environment, financial resources 
must also be given scrutiny. Blau (Ibid.:250-1) has 
pointed out the significance of an affluent institution; 
indeed, without the money, the best qualified professors 
could not be attracted to do the research and to attract 
the best students. Because there were no direct indicators 
of an institution's affluence, it was felt that salaries 
would provide an adequate proxy measure. As Blau 
indicated: "Generally, then, low salaries go together with
other disadvantageous conditions in institutions of higher 
education, which furnishes an institutional source of 
academic status consistency or crystallization, since it 
makes the position of faculty members who get low salaries 
worse with respect to power and prestige as well"(Ibid.). 
Consequently, salaries were indicated in this study with 
the variable SALARY which ranged from a low of below $8000 
to over $25000, controlling for contract length.
Financial resources obtained from sources external to 
_ne institution are as crucial, if not more so, than 
salaries, in stimulating research. Blau's (Ibid.:151) 
findings suggest that "...federal financial support is
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strongly correlated with an orientation to research in an
institution(r=.56)". By extension, the same can also be
said for other forms of finacial aid. For these reasons,
then, the creation and inclusion of the variable GRANTS was
believed to be justified. Conversely, a variable
indicating difficulty in obtaining financial aid for
research was included:
In the past 2-3 years it has become much harder to get 
research support for work in my field(HARDSUP):
Responses ranged from strongly agree to strongly 
disagree in four categories.
Other variables were included in this study that were 
considered to be indirect indicators of resources. These 
included time allocation preferences and indicators of 
attitudes concerning research. Time allocation variables 
included time spent with teaching. Basically, it is 
believed that the more time spent in teaching
undergraduates, the less time that can be allotted for 
research activities. Similarly, another variable was 
concerned with preferences for teaching or research in an 
institution. Blau (Ibid.:223) has found that undue 
emphasis on undergraduate teaching is detrimental to both 
research and teaching— a finding that may suggest that 
cumulative advantage will have a greater deleterious impact 
on faculty in non-research oriented colleges as compared 
with those in research oriented colleges. A further
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variable indicated the time spent with graduate student
teaching and consultation. Since working with graduate
students is apparently preferable to work with
undergraduates in research oriented departments, and since
graduate teaching can at times be associated with research,
this variable indirectly ties in with utilization of time
that may indicate time allocated for research in
conjunction with graduate teaching, especially in the case
of doctoral granting institutions(Blau,Ibid245). These
variables included:
Do your interests lie primarily in teaching of 
research(INTTCH):
Responses ranged from very heavily in research to very 
heavily in teaching in four categories.
How many hours per week on the average are you 
spending... in formal classroom instruction in 
graduate or professional courses (GRADTCH):
Responses ranged from zero to twenty—one or more hours 
in ten categories.
During the spring term, how many hours per week on the 
average are spending in...formal classroom instruction 
in undergraduate courses(TCHTIME)?:
Responses ranged from none to eight hours in five 
categories.
A variable believed to tap into an individual's innate 
characteristics, and that are believed to be indicative of 
an individual's capacity for research included
subordinating most of one's time to scholarly work. This
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variable can be applied to both teaching and research; 
but, the 1975 survey does not tap into the research
inclinations of the respondents to any great extent— or it
would seem. This variable was constructed as follows:
I tend to subordinate all aspects of my life to my 
work(WORK):
Responses ranged from strongly agree to strongly
disagree in four categories.
The entire sample was segregated into four groups 
utilizing the *SELECT IF procedure on the SPSS program (See 
appendix B). Using the Carnegie Commission Survey variable 
CARNCODE (see appendix C), research and doctoral granting
institutions were given the value of one; all others were 
coded zero. Those institutions coded one were labelled 
DOCUNIV; these institutions must be currently engaged in 
research, the granting of Ph.D's or both. Further, and 
perhaps more importantly, these institutions were receiving 
at least a modicum of federal financial aid. The research 
institution categories were the 100 leading institutions in 
terms of aid and Ph.D's granted (no less than 50). The 
doctoral granting universities received less federal aid 
than the research universities and awarded no less than 10 
Ph.D's per annum. The distinction between DOCUNIV and the 
and the remaining institutions is based on the 
observation(Blau,1973; Reskin,1977) that these
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institutions have enough qualified personnel to do 
research.
The final two categories were broken down into the 
natural sciences (NATSCI) and all others. The literature 
on cumulative advantage surveyed thus far has focused
almost exclusively with scholars of the natural sciences.
By examining the results of the data analysis, not only 
could evidence of cumulative advantage be demonstrated, but 
also, in the other disciplines as well, where scholarly 
production appears to be of considerably lesser
significance.
An additional variable was used for data analysis 
purposes; a control was necessary to segregate full time 
professors from administrators. This was accomplished 
using the BASE variable. This allowed the selection of 
faculty with nine month rather than twelve month contracts.
In order to make use of Allison's(1980) modified 
coefficient of variation, it was necessary to run the SPSS 
CONDESCRIPTIVE procedure on the variables selected; 
because CONDESCRIPTIVE allows for the "the calculation of 
descriptive statistics for continuous data..."(Nie, et 
al.,1975:186), it was possible to select the means and 
variances for each variable necessary for the computation 
of Allison's measure.
Because this study uses cross-sectional data, the
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variable year of receipt of highest degree taken 
(DEGREEYR), was used to create synthetic cohort data. 
DEGREEYR was broken down into categories of the year the 
Ph.D was taken: these ranged from 1933 and older to 1975.
Using the IF and *SELECT IF card for each year category, 
followed by *SELECT IF^s for natural science and doctoral 
granting respondents, CONDESCRIPTIVES were run for all 
variables believed to be inherent to cumulative advantage. 
Thus, with ten DEGREEYR categories, and four non-redundant 
categories of NATSCI and DOCUNIV, forty CONDESCRIPTIVE 
cards were used to calculate the means and variances for 
each variable (see appendices D and E).
The means and statistics obtained from the 
CONDESCRIPTIVES were then entered onto a single computer 
file, from which the modified coefficient of variation 
could be computed. Appendix F contains the SPSS command 
file used to compute the coefficient of variation. It 
should be noted that each coefficient was multiplied by 100 
to increase the magnitude of what would often have been 
very small figures. The SCATTERGRAM procedure was then 
used to plot the computed coefficient with each of the 
variables; results are tabulated in table A below.
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Table A
Correlations of all variables with degree year
NON
NON'
-NATSCI*
-DOCUNV*
NATSCI 
NONDOCUNV
NON-NATSCI
DOCUNV
NATSCI
DOCUNV
@C:LATEPUBL .452 -.598 .874 .956
C :ARTPUBL .876 .710 .789 .412
C:GRANTS .742 .462 .097 -.358
C :HARDSUP .703 -.223 .340 -.672
C :SALARY .825 .750 .945 .851
C :TCHTIME .222 .536 -.401 .589
C :GRADTCH -.178 -.485 -.578 .489
C :INTTCH .092 .225 .862 .909
C:WORK .045 .202 .523 -.328
C :DEPREP -.769 -.848 -.847 -.852
C :INTEL -.534 -.809 -.818 -.552
C :INTENV -.342 -.851 -.731 -.685
* * * * * * * * *
*DOCUNV indicates respondents doctoral granting programs.
NATSCI indicates respondents natural science disciplines. 
@C: indicates variable is modified coefficient of variation.
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Because the variables used in this study do not meet 
the requirements of the assumption of independence, 
multiple regression analysis would therefore be 
inappropriate. That is, "if repeated measurements are 
obtained from the same experimental unit, the observations 
are not independent"(Norusis,1982: 94). Statistical
inference, therefore, was limited to simple correlations of 
the variables with the coefficient of variation.
Apparently, the coefficient of variation is an 
under-utilized statistic, particularly in regards to 
measures of inequality. Other measures have been used to 
indicate inequality, such as the Gini index, Theil's 
measure of inequality, the standard deviation of . the
logarithms, the variance, and Gaston's(1978) coefficient of 
variability. Allison(1980) takes these measures to task on 
the grounds of "diminishing sensitivity, redundancy, and 
scale invariance. He points out that "when the variable of 
interest is the number of events that occur in some
interval of time, all the scale invariant measures suffer 
from a peculiar problem— they tend to increase as the
interval of time becomes shorter"(Ibid.:168). Ostensibly, 
this would pose a problem in recording inequalities of 
production at the onset of one's career in terms of
cumulative advantage. Further, Allison attributes this
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flaw, particularly with regards to publications, to "purely
random variation". Addressing this problem,
Allison(Ibid.:169) notes that:
Since the observed number of publications is 
assumed to contain purely random variation, it 
would be more desirable to know the coefficient 
of variation for R, the latent rate of 
publication. Even though R cannot be directly 
observed, its coefficient of variation can be 
expressed in terms of the mean and variance of 
the observed number of publications. This 
modified, squared coefficient of variation...is 
given by
Variance - Mean
C  ----------------------
Mean squared
Further, Allison notes that "although C is not scale 
invariant for the observed number of publications, it is 
scale invariant for ...the latent rate of 
publication(Ibid.:170). By scale invariant, we mean those 
measures in a scale "which remain constant when every 
individual's score is multiplied by a
constant"(Allison,1982:617).
What has been done in this study is an attempt to 
measure not only the differences in publications across 
disciplines, but also to include other factors that are 
believed to contribute to the process of cumulative 
advantage. The utility of Allison's measure cannot be 
restricted to publications alone; it allows one to measure 
inequality regardless of whether one is measuring
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productivity, rewards or resources. In specifying such 
inequality, one is at the same time able to specify the 
components of cumulative advantage. Further, and perhaps 
more importantly, this measure cannot be limited 
specifically to inequality in science; its utility must be 
extended to other areas of social inequality in which 
previous studies have concluded with ambiguous measures. 
Using Allison's coefficient of variation will enable a 
simplified— but accurate— measurement of the variation in 
factors that are believed to be an inherent part of 
cumulative advantage.
CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS
The purpose of this section is to present an analysis 
of the variables described in the previous chapter. The 
basic hypothesis of this study states that if cumulative 
advantage operates, then there will be increasing 
variability of scholarly productivity and of access to 
rewards and resources that arise from that production. A 
corollary hypothesis states that if cumulative advantage 
operates, natural scientists at doctoral universities will 
experience less variability over time in regards to 
obtaining financial resources, as compared with scholars 
who do not meet these criteria. This corollary hypothesis 
was developed because it is believed that the hard sciences 
have much more clearly developed paradigms than do the 
other sciences. That is, grant proposals may be more 
rationally examined; considerations here will not be based
56
on a scholar's past record, but rather on the fact that 
these disciplines have a clearly articulated paradigm that 
will facilitate research.
The previous chapter noted that Allison's modified 
coefficient of variation would be used as the measure of 
inequality. This measure was derived using the means and 
variances of the twelve variables used here (see appendix 
D). These measures were categorized according to year 
Ph.D. was taken, and according to whether the respondents 
were in the natural sciences and whether the respondents 
were in departments having Ph.D. programs. This
categorization resulted in forty sets of means and 
variances for each of the twelve variables. The
coefficient of variability was then derived using SPSS 
commands and are listed in tables B through M.
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Table B
Coefficients of Variation— Late Publications
NON-NATSCI* NATSCI NON-NATSCI NATSCI
N ON—D OC UNV * N0N-D0CUNV DOCUNV DOCUNV
DEGREEYR**
10 -24.790 -44.576 -11.958 -12.244
9 -31.579 -39.857 -14.721 -10.071
8 -37.667 -36.059 -16.235 -11.113
7 -41.328 -37.228 -15.526 -13.964
6 -31.130 -32.633 -17.662 -15.446
5 -32.890 -23.042 -15.184 -17.057
4 -36.863 -31.640 -16.830 -18.678
3 -33.252 -34.558 -18.383 -18.994
2 -33.944 -31.199 -19.192 -19.098
1 -40.080 -34.378 -23.506 -20.925
******
Pearson's r, Late publications with Degree Year
******
.452 -.598 .874 .956
* DOCUNV indicates respondents in doctoral granting programs.
NATSCI indicates respondents in natural science disciplines.
**DEGREEYR values begin with earliest awarded degrees.
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Table C
Coefficients of Variation— Articles Published, Career
NON-NATSCI* NATSCI NON-NATSCI NATSCI
NON-D OCUNV* NON-DOCUNV DOCUNV DOCUNV
DEGREEYR**
10 16.913 0.953 -4.851 -11.172
9 1.647 -2.712 -4.512 -12.552
8 1.491 6.978 -4.206 -12.520
7 3.301 5.928 -4.864 -11.863
6 5.812 1.558 -6.999 -14.336
5 1.418 1.516 -7.322 -14.281
4 -3.650 0.413 -6.877 -14.605
3 -3.361 -3.168 -6.035 -13.785
2 -15.646 -11.110 -8.063 -12.241
1 -28.690 -21.381 -13.867 -12.733
* * * * * *
Pearson's r: Articles published with degree year.
* * * * * *
.876 .710 .789 .412
* DOCUNV indicates respondents in doctoral training programs.
NATSCI indicates respondents in natural science disciplines.
**DEGREEYR values begin with earliest awarded degrees.
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Table D
Coefficients of Variation— Grants from outside sources.
NON-NATSCI* NATSCI NON-NATSCI NATSCI
NON-DOCUNV* NON-DOCUNV DOCUNV DOCUNV
DEGREEYR**
10 464.773 73.046 36.952 -62.977
9 840.237 904.892 35.919 -22.826
8 548.697 375.669 64.735 8.695
7 406.036 89.844 68.461 -28.888
6 686.391 169.935 64.870 -7.794
5 422.400 116.774 24.707 -27.027
4 342.403 170.741 38.991 -27.763
3 283.053 93.263 26.321 -22.242
2 218.470 89.403 36.438 -16.536
1 261.066 126.754 62.113 -9.569
ie'k'k^ ck'k
Pearson's r: Grants with degree year. 
******
.742 .462 .097 -.358
* DOCUNV indicates respondents in doctoral granting programs
NATSCI indicates respondents in natural science disciplines.
**DEGREEYR values begin with earliest awarded degrees.
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Table E
Coefficients of Variation— Difficulty in receiving funds.
NON-NATSCI* NATSCI NON-NATSCI NATSCI
NON-DOCUNV* NON-DOCUNV DOCUNV DOCUNV
DEGREEYR**
10 -23.952 -43.312 -29.140 -55.179
9 -27.534 -43.172 -28.145 -48.025
8 -29.021 -36.800 -34.283 -40.105
7 28.771 -41.808 -34.232 -37.028
6 -29.419 -37.917 -35.333 -37.672
5 -32.975 -38.807 -33.967 -37.940
4 -29.727 -43.922 -32.158 -37.275
3 -31.155 -39.052 -32.952 -39.688
2 -30.446 -38.365 -33.315 -41.000
1 -29.904 -41.526 -31.494 -36.283
Pearson's r : Difficulty
******
receiving funds with degree year.
.703
******
-.223 .340 -.672
* DOCUNV indicates respondents in doctoral granting programs.
NATSCI indicates respondents in natural science disciplines.
**DEGREEYR values begin with earliest awarded degrees.
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Table F
Coefficients of Variation---Salaries
NON-NATSCI* NATSCI NON-NATSCI NATSCI
NON-DOCUNV* NON-DOCUNV DOCUNV DOCUNV
DEGREEYR**
10 8.746 29.169 2.044 -5.434
9 0.440 6.915 -0.325 -8.288
8 10.405 -4.746 -3.828 -7.466
7 2.101 -3.573 -4.532 -6.468
6 -0.049 -4.178 -5.539 -7.583
5 3.593 -3.842 -5.261 -7.857
4 1.060 -8.188 -5.622 -9.027
3 -3.503 -7.524 -6.703 -10.921
2 -6.266 -8.349 -10.996 -15.773
1 -6.793 -8.822 -13.311 -18.414
Pearson's r: 
.825
******
salaries with 
******
.945
degree year 
.750 .851
* DOCUNV indicates respondents in doctoral granting programs.
NATSCI indicates respondents in natural science disciplines.
**DEGREEYR values begin with earliest awarded degrees.
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Table G
Coefficients of Variation— Time teaching undergraduates.
NON-NATSCI* NATSCI NON-NATSCI NATSCI
N ON-D OCUNV * NON-DOCUNV DOCUNV DOCUNV
DEGREEYR**
10 12.074 13.471 -7.333 -1.927
9 -1.055 -2.165 -2.952 -5.486
8 1.033 4.958 -0.587 -6.004
7 6.391 1.693 -2.271 -4.883
6 5.904 2.540 -3.292 -4.701
5 4.286 5.700 -3.899 -6.312
4 2.458 -0.438 -3.116 -5.404
3 4.140 1.354 -2.329 -6.102
2 3.524 0.942 -2.191 -5.783
1 3.553 -1.349 -2.356 -5.830
* * * * * *
Pearson's r: Time teaching undergraduate with degree year.
* * * * * *
.222 .536 -.401 .589
* DOCUNV indicates respondents in doctoral granting programs.
NATSCI indicates respondents in natural science disciplines.
**DEGREEYR values begin with earliest awarded degrees.
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Table H
Coefficients of Variation— Time teaching graduate students.
NON-NATSCI* NATSCI NON-NATSCI NATSCI
DEGREEYR**
NON-DOCUNV* NON-DOCUNV DOCUNV DOCUNV
10 -6.971 -9.811 -9.515 -4.634
9 -6.547 -9.006 -6.823 -8.514
8 -8.026 -8.468 -6.210 -4.562
7 -6.859 -8.271 -7.169 -5.730
6 -7.282 -7.598 -6.921 -6.908
5 -6.915 -7.626 -7.139 -7.813
4 -6.480 -7.955 -6.063 -7.395
3 -6.840 -8.295 -6.828 -7.880
2 -6.764 -8.460 -6.641 -7.475
1 -7.154 -8.516
******
-6.228 -7.071
Pearson's r: Time teaching graduate students with 
******
degree yei
-.178 -.485 -.578 .489
* DOCUNV indicates respondents in doctoral granting programs.
NATSCI indicates respondents in natural science disciplines.
**DEGREEYR values begin with earliest awarded degrees.
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Table I
Coefficients of Variation— Departmental reputation.
NON-NATSCI* NATSCI NON-NATSCI NATSCI
DEGREEYR**
NON-DOCUNV* N0N-D0CUNV DOCUNV DOCUNV
10 -32.285 -47.359 -34.257 -37.143
9 -34.687 -36.366 -37.694 -32.916
8 -36.666 -33.083 -35.309 -33.854
7 -34.673 -34.565 -32.900 -32.316
6 -34.502 -36.421 -35.056 -32.603
5 -32.516 -35.421 -34.393 -32.875
4 -32.100 -30.127 -32.623 -33.333
3 -31.418 -32.017 -31.770 -31.011
2 -30.016 -27.279 -30.447 -28.876
1 -28.704 -25.743 -28.903 -25.608
******
Pearson's r: department's reputation with degree year.
* *****
-.769 -.848 -.847 -.852
* DOCUNV indicates respondents in doctoral granting programs.
NATSCI indicates respondents in natural science disciplines.
**DEGREEYR values begin with earliest awarded degrees.
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Table J
Coefficients of variation— Intellectual environment, general.
NON-NATSCI* NATSCI NON-NATSCI NATSCI
NON-DOCUNV* NON-DOCUNV DOCUNV DOCUNV
DEGREEYR**
10 -28.621 -30.942 -31.816 -28.626
9 -30.827 -35.202 -35.272 -31.510
8 -30.519 -33.321 -34.069 -31.640
7 -28.592 -31.981 -32.412 -28.375
6 -30.872 -29.982 -32.187 -30.041
5 -30.462 -29.076 -32.682 -30.771
4 -29.347 -28.684 -32.178 -30.420
3 -28.369 -29.213 -30.029 -29.297
2 -28.051 -28.695 -28.900 -28.052
1 -27.878 -28.073 -29.341 -25.913
******
Pearson's r: general intellectual environment with degree year.
******
-.534 -.809 -.818 -.552
* DOCUNV indicates respondents in doctoral granting programs.
NATSCI indicates respondents in natural science disciplines.
**DEGREEYR begin with earliest awarded degrees.
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Table K
Coefficients of Variation— Dept'l. intellectual environment.
NON-NATSCI* NATSCI NON-NATSCI NATSCI
NON-DOCUNV* NON-DOCUNV DOCUNV DOCUNV
DEGREEYR**
10 -28.844 -40.117 -29.875 -30.470
9 -29.786 -37.555 -34.700 -35.485
8 -34.498 -32.830 -35.051 -32.441
7 -29.713 -31.280 -30.637 -35.496
6 -32.300 -33.683 -31.135 -30.750
5 -31.821 -31.992 -30.994 -32.402
4 -29.841 -31.398 -29.105 -32.492
3 -30.140 -32.030 -28.113 -29.760
2 -28.632 -29.581 -28.251 -27.575
1 28.124 -29.398 -28.029 -26.928
******
Pearson's r: dept.'s intellectual environment with degree year.
* * * * * *
-.342 -.851 -.731 -.685
* DOCUNV indicates respondents in doctoral granting programs.
NATSCI indicates respondents in natural science disciplines.
**DEGREEYR values begin with earliest awarded degrees.
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Table L
Coefficients of Variation— Work habits.
NON-NATSCI* NATSCI NON-NATSCI NATSCI
DOCUNV
-25.587 
-26.178 
-24.045 
-28.590 
-25.554 
-25.654 
-25.175 
-24.444 
-25.468 
-24.542
NON-DOCUNV* NON—DOCUNV DOCUNV
DEGREEYR**
10 -23.704 -25.065 -22.940
9 -26.133 -22.588 -23.007
8 -22.397 -24.920 -24.686
7 -23.219 -24.201 -24.278
6 -24.324 -22.101 -25.503
5 -24.458 -24.803 -24.798
4 -24.427 -24.834 -24.953
3 -24.387 -24.927 -24.370
2 -23.991 -24.927 -24.370
1 -24.110 -24.059 -24.454
******
Pearson's r: work habits with degree year.
******
.045 .202 .523 -.328
* DOCUNV indicates respondents in doctoral granting programs.
NATSCI indicates respondents in natural science disciplines.
**DEGREEYR values begin with earliest awarded degrees.
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Table M
Coefficients of Variation— Teach or research preferences.
NON-NATSCI* NATSCI NON-NATSCI NATSCI
NON-DOCUNV* NON-DOCUNV DOCUNV DOCUNV
DEGREEYR**
10 -25.490 -25.535 -24.332 -21.787
9 -24.772 -22.942 -26.166 -26.501
8 -24.719 -24.622 -25.556 -29.010
7 -24.771 -25.067 -25.327 -28.581
6 -24.572 -24.726 -25.269 -29.478
5 -24.626 -24.256 -27.068 -33.634
4 -24.836 -24.562 -26.614 -32.816
3 -24.970 -24.592 -26.770 -33.242
2 -25.039 -24.500 -27.382 -33.132
1 -25.278 -25.565 -27.716 -34.280
******
Pearon^s r: teach or research preference with degree year.
******
.092 .225 .862 .909
* DOCUNV indicates respondents in doctoral granting programs.
NATSCI indicates respondents in natural science disciplines. 
**DEGREEYR values begin with earliest awarded degrees.
These measures were then correlated with year the Ph.D. 
was taken which resulted in a total of forty-eight 
correlations— twelve each in four categories. These 
measures, therefore, have served as the basis for this 
analysis. That is, positive correlations will indicate 
increasing variability over time, noting of course that
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this study is limited to cross-sectional rather than 
longitudinal data. Differences in these
correlations— strong or weak, positive or negative— on a 
comparative basis between respondent categories, will 
indicate whether inferences about the cumulative advantage 
hypothesis can be made. See Table A for a listing of these 
correlations.
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Table A
Correlations of all variables with degree year
N0N-
N0N-
-NATSCI*
-DOCUNV*
NATSCI 
NONDOCUNV
NON-NATSCI
DOCUNV
NATSCI
DOCUNV
@C:LATEPUBL .452 -.598 .874 .956
C :ARTPUBL .876 .710 .789 .412
C :GRANTS .742 .462 .097 -.358
C:HARDSUP .703 -.223 .340 -.672
C : SALARY .825 .750 .945 .851
C :TCHTIME .222 .536 -.401 .589
C :GRADTCH -.178 -.485 -.578 .489
C :INTTCH .092 .225 .862 .909
C:W0RK .045 .202 .523 -.328
C :DEPREP -.769 -.848 -.847 -.852
C :INTEL -.534 -.809 -.818 -.552
C :INTENV -.342 -.851 -.731 -.685
*********
*D0CUNV indicates respondents doctoral granting programs.
NATSCI indicates respondents natural science disciplines. 
@C: indicates variable is modified coefficient of variation.
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The variables of primary interest are C:LATEPUBL and 
C:ARTPUBL (C: denoting that the variable is the
coefficient of variation). These variables indicate the 
impetus of cumulative advantage. That is, we can not be 
certain as to whether cumulative advantage operates until 
variability of research productivity can be demonstrated. 
Table A contains the correlations of C:LATEPUBL and 
C :ARTPUBL with DEGREEYR.
Recalling that LATEPUBL was coded from zero to over 
twelve articles within the past twenty-four months, we find 
mixed results in Table A. Variability in the non-doctoral, 
non-natural science category is moderately correlated with 
DEGREEYR (r=.452), suggesting that cumulative adavantage is 
in operation here but perhaps for reasons dissimilar for 
the other categories. In the doctoral granting, 
non-natural science category, however, the correlation 
(r=.874) is much stronger than that of the preceding 
category. Because doctoral granting institutions are more 
heavily involved in research, natural sciences aside 
(Blau,1973;Rosenzwieg and Turlington, 1982) we would expect 
that cumulative advantage would be more likely to operate 
in this category of respondents.
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The disparity in the natural science, non-doctoral 
category (r=-.598) (See Table A) suggests that the 
cumulative advantage hypothesis does not apply those 
natural scientists who are not involved in doctoral 
programs. The doctoral granting, natural science 
respondents show the strongest correlation of DEGREEYR with 
variability of lately published articles(r=.956). This 
category includes the highest ranked— in terms of quality 
and prestige— of all the institutions surveyed in the 1975 
study of higher education. This suggests that since the 
competition among these institutions for resources is great 
(Hagstrom,1971:375), then it should also hold that 
cumulative advantage will exert its greatest influence 
among respondents at these institutions. What is important 
regarding C:LATEPUBL is that we see evidence of cumulative 
advantage at doctoral universities and less evidence of 
cumulative advantage at non-doctoral universities— which 
fits the primary hypothesis of this study.
In conjunction with the variable dealing with total 
publications (C:ARTPUBL, life time articles published, zero 
to over twenty-four), we find consistent support for the 
cumulative advantage hypothesis. Table A indicates 
consistently strong support for the cumulative advantage 
hypothesis in conjunction with articles published. 
Evidence of cumulative advantage is strongest for articles
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published in the first three categories while the last 
category demonstrates a moderate correlation. These 
findings support the primary hypothesis and by extension, 
the corollary hypothesis as well. It is suggested that 
because production of research articles in the last 
category would be greater per person, then over time that 
variability would decrease. Since the research-doctoral 
respondents receive a preponderance of aid, it would seem 
that researchers in this category would, per person, be in 
a stronger position to conduct research, offering some 
support for the corollary hypothesis. Further, since 
productivity is associated with promotions (Gregario, et 
al.,1982:498), promotion may mean greater administrative 
duties that prevent the production of articles, and hence, 
the reduction in variation of publications in this category 
over time (cf. Knorr, et al., op.cit). Generally, the 
findings indicate that cumulative advantage operates 
strongly at doctoral institutions in terms of research 
productivity.
Perhaps the most important variables in regard to 
resources— indeed, to cumulative advantage— are the 
variables related to funding. These variables included 
grants received from federal, state, private and industrial 
sources (C:GRANTS), salary(C:SALARY) and an indicator of 
difficulty in attaining financial support within the past
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two years (CtHARDSUP). As was noted in the previous 
chapter, salaries may be viewed as either a form of reward 
or as a resource. This study will assume salary to be a 
form of reward, since it seems likely that not much can be 
done with one's salary in a way that it can make a direct 
contribution to that person's research efforts. Obviously, 
a case can be made for salary as an indirect resource; 
but, such considerations would be beyond the scope of this 
study.
The variable of primary interest here is C:GRANTS. If 
cumulative advantage operates in respect to outside
funding, then we would expect to observe strong
correlations of C:GRANTS with DEGREEYR. In addition, the 
corollary hypothesis, if true, would dictate greater
variability in the non-natural science, non-doctoral 
categories. This is apparently the case with the 
non-doctoral, non-natural science category (r=.742), since 
this category contains respondents from both non-doctoral 
granting and non-natural science backgrounds. The third 
category, doctoral granting, non-natural science
respondents, indicated a weak (.097) correlation, offering 
fairly consistent support for both the primary and 
corollary hypotheses in that funding of these respondents 
at these institutions experienced less variability around 
the average for funds received. The second category
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demonstrates a moderate (.462) correlation, suggesting that 
cumulative advantage is more likely to operate among 
non-doctoral granting respondents. Considering the 
findings so far, it is not surprising that the last 
category's correlation would be a moderately negative 
correlation of -.358. At this point, we may tentatively 
conclude that we cannot reject the cumulative advantage 
hypothesis. Further, we can also state that, in terms of 
research articles and outside funding, that cumulative 
advantage will have a stronger impact on non-doctoral 
granting respondents than those who are involved with the 
conferral of the Ph.D. That is, non-doctoral respondents 
will experience greater variability of articles published 
and outside funds received over time than will those 
respondents in the doctoral granting programs.
The question remains, however, in conjunction with the 
difficulty respondents may have had in procuring the 
necessary funds to conduct research. The variable 
C:HARDSUP was employed in an attempt to answer this 
question. Again, in relation to cumulative advantage, the 
correlations were not surprising. The first category's 
respondents demonstrate that receiving outside funds will 
over time, become more variable than in any other category 
(r=.703). For respondents in the third category, this 
variability was only moderate, as indicated by the
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correlation of r=.340 Again, it appears that cumulative 
advantage will have a considerably lesser impact on 
doctoral-granting individuals and institutions. The second 
category respondents in the non-doctoral, natural science 
disciplines were even less likely to experience variability 
in procuring funds (r=-.223), while the fourth category 
apparently has little trouble in receiving support 
(r=-.672). These findings seem to fit nicely with the 
primary hypothesis of this study. That is, among these 
faculty receiving grants, the situation may be less 
problematic than for other faculty and relatively high 
productivity can be maintained and even improved during 
their careers. However, it would seem that since the 
second category's correlation with C:GRANTS was moderately 
positive while the CrHARDSUP correlation was negative, it 
might serve the purposes of this study to invoke the issue 
of a discipline's paradigm development. That is, the 
paradigms of the hard sciences may facilitate the screening 
of grant proposals such that the researcher's "track 
record" is not a significant factor in who or why a project 
is funded.
The variable C:SALARY is fairly consistent with most 
of the literature concerning salaries generally and 
cumulative advantage. If anything, the correlations of 
C:SALARY with DEGREEYR demonstrates the utility of the
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coefficient of variation. Along with C:ARTPUBL, C:SALARY 
offers the most consistent support for the primary
hypothesis of this study. It would seem that salary 
variation is not a function of one's discipline or whether 
one is involved in Ph.D. programs.
Summarizing, we may tentatively state that to this
point, the cumulative advantage hypothesis cannot be 
rejected in conjunction with the variables used so far.
For the most part, these variables have been objective and 
structural in nature. However, we should also consider 
subjective and processual variables as well. These
varaiables are for the most part concerned with resources, 
notably time, individual characteristics and environment.
Time must be considered as a significant resource; 
for this reason, time teaching undergraduates (TCHTIME) and 
time teaching graduate students (GRADTCH) were selected. 
Table A lists the correlations of these variables with 
DEGREEYR. It will be recalled that the TCHTIME and GRADTCH 
items ranged from zero to over twenty-one hours per week 
with undergraduate and graduate students. Overall, the 
findings show that within both natural science categories 
there is a rather strong positive correlation of TCHTIME 
and DEGREEYR. This indicates that these respondents 
encountered increasing variability from the average time 
required for undergraduate instruction. In other words,
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cumulative advantage appears to operate more within the 
natural sciences in conjunction with undergraduate
teaching. Why this is evident can only be speculated;
but, this finding must be indicative to one extent or 
another of the division of labor encountered by these 
respondents at their respective institutions.
Besides undergraduate teaching, we must also consider 
graduate teaching (GRADTCH). C:GRADTCH has a fairly 
consistent pattern suggesting that cumulative advantage
operates among natural scientists at research universities 
in conjunction with graduate instruction, which on face 
value makes sense. However, we see in Table A that the 
first natural science category is not characterized by 
doctoral programs. Either this means that these 
respondents work with master's candidates or else these 
respondents do have a limited number of doctoral programs 
at their institutions. Without the pertinent data to prove 
or disprove these explanations, further considerations
would be overly speculative.
Environment must also be considered a resource 
(Blau,1973;Pelz & Andrews,1966), for without it, processes 
conducive to production would be lacking and hence, little 
if any scholarly productivity. Further, this would support 
Simmel's contention that ”[t]he more refined, highly 
developed, articulated the qualities of an individual are,
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the more unlikely are they to make him similar to other 
individuals and to form a unit with corresponding qualities 
in others" (1964:32). Regardless of whether the 
respondents were heavily involved in research or teaching, 
the fact remains that these individuals have been
rigorously trained for a professional career that must 
create a common denominator between and among the
respondents in this study.
Consequently, three variables were used to indicate 
the intellectual environment of the respondents over time. 
These included C:INTEL, CrINTENV and C:DEPREP; see chapter 
three for the discussion concerning these variables. All 
correlations for intellectual environment, whether the
environment was institutional or departmental, were at 
least moderate; and, all were negative. The environment 
items at least have the advantage of consistency— they all 
lead us to reject the cumulative advantage hypothesis. 
However, the main problem in explaining this convergence 
for the older professors is that we do not have any way of 
knowing whether these subjective perceptions have much to 
do with objective aspects of the environment, and hence, 
its relationship to the increased variability of 
production, resources and rewards. It might be well to 
invoke a social learning hypothesis at this point; but to 
do so would be to go beyond the limits of this study.
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Nevertheless, it may be that objective heterogeneity may
persist while subjective distinctions become smaller for
the older members of the sample used here. Regardless of 
the issues raised concerning intellectual environment, we 
can at least tentatively state that these subjective,
processual variables do not aid in our understanding of 
cumulative advantage.
Resources unique to the respondents must also be 
considered. The variable C:INTTCH deals with a preferences 
for either research or teaching. Examining Table A 
demonstrates that the doctoral granting respondents 
experienced more dispersion in regards to the C:INTTCH 
variable than with the other two categories. The reader 
will be reminded that the INTTCH item reflected a 
respondent's ranged from heavily involved in research to 
heavily involved in teaching. Looking at Table A indicates 
that not much support is given to the hypotheses of this 
study, particularly when comparing the INTTCH findings with 
either the objective or subjective variables already 
examined. However, in both doctoral granting categories, 
we find strong correlations that appear to tie in with the 
hypotheses. Both categories show increasing variability 
from the average interest in research or teaching, with the 
doctoral, natural science category having the strongest 
correlation of the two (r=.909). Nevertheless, it is
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unclear at this point whether these subjective perceptions 
influence any increases of variability around average 
productivity, and resources and rewards received over time.
The C:WORK variable was used in an attempt to discern 
whether a preference for precise rigorous research 
influenced the variability of productivity, resources and 
rewards. The correlations are, at best, ambiguous. We see 
that in the first two categories little if any support is 
given to the cumulative advantage hypothesis. The last two 
categories, where one would expect at least some consistent 
interaction of C:WORK with other variables, is inconsistent 
with the third category having a fairly strong positive 
correlation and the last having a moderate negative
correlation. It is suggested here that increases in the
variability of a preference for precise work is related to 
increases in the variability of, most notably, recently 
published articles.
In summary of the findings, we may conclude that the 
variables dealing with the relatively unambiguous 
indicators of research productivity (LATEPUBL and ARTPUBL)
and resources (GRANTS, SALARY and HARDSUP) offered the most
consistent support for the hypotheses of this study. That 
is, we are led not to reject the cumulative advantage 
hypothesis. However, with the subjective and processual 
variables, particulalry the environmental items (C:INTEL,
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C:INTENV and C:DEPREP), we are led to reject the cumualtive 
advantage hypothesis. Since we cannot explain the point at 
which the subjective affects the objective and vice versa, 
these findings lead us conservatively to keep the 
cumulative advantage hypothesis rather than rejecting it. 
This conclusion is decidedly at odds with the preponderance 
of literature concerning the process of cumulative 
advantage. That is, most of the literature has dwelled 
upon individual factors such as productivity and citations 
to published literature, among other things. Therefore, 
the concluding chapter will attempt to amplify the 
reasoning behind the findings of this chapter.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This study has attempted to test the cumulative 
advantage hypothesis, which implies that over time there 
will be increasing variability in scientific research 
productivity, rewards for that productivity, and access to 
the resources necessary for continued productivity. A 
corollary hypothesis states that this same variability is 
also applicable not only to individuals, but to the 
institutions at which research is conducted.
Before concluding, several qualifications are in 
order. First, this study did not use longitudinal, or true 
cohort data; therefore, all inferences must be regarded 
with a healthy degree of skepticism. Indeed, without 
benefit of longitudinal data, the findings reported here 
may very well be spurious (Long, 1978:889). On the other 
hand, it appears that studies of cumulative advantage,
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whether they made use of true or synthetic cohorts, have 
demonstrated the same pattern: that the production of
research and the accumulation of advantages exhibit 
increasing variability (or inequality) over time (Cole and 
Cole,1973: 237-47;Allison and Stewart,1974; Faia,1975;
Zuckerman,1977:Ch.8). In contrast to Allison's charge that 
there has been a failure to demonstrate the existence of 
cumulative advantage, it is argued here that this process 
does in fact exist. And, that the above researchers have, 
to one extent or another, demonstrated this. If anything, 
a study is needed that meets or exceeds the methodological 
criteria to the point where controversy over the 
intricacies of methodology can be put to rest. Use of 
Census Bureau data concerning scientists will provide a 
partial solution to this problem (Bureau of the Census, 
1980).
It is argued here that the real problem with 
cumulative advantage is in the interpretation of the 
findings. With a few notable exceptions, most studies of 
cumulative advantage have been myopic in that factors other 
than individual characteristics are not considered. A 
holistic approach is necessary. By holistic, it is meant 
that a study considers not only differences in
productivity, prestige and resources at the individual 
level, but also organizational factors that affect an
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individual's career chances and indirect forces that 
influence the department, institution or both in which the 
professor works.
Second , this study did not use multiple regression 
analysis due to the nature of the data source. On the 
other hand, use of the coefficient of variation— an 
apparently underutilized measure— has made for a relatively 
straightforward measure of variation over time, given 
cross-sectional data. Use of the coefficient of variation 
in the manner of Allison's model demonstrates the utility 
of this statistic as an indicator of variability over time.
Third, several variables used in this study suggest 
their limited usefulness in the explanation of the process 
of cumulative advantage. Questionnaire items dealing with 
preferences for teaching or research, of work habits, etc., 
may not, in the long run, contribute to an understanding of 
cumulative advantage. Yet most other studies have not 
considered these factors to any great extent. 
Correlational findings reported in the previous chapter 
between individual, attitudinal variables and cumulative 
advantage were noticeably discrepant from the patterns 
found between the objective, structural indicators of 
productivity and the distribution of rewards and resources. 
Further, it is believed that this disparity is a function 
of the general difficulty in sociology to account for the
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continuity that begins with the individual, ends in a
larger structure, and the feedback processes that
intimately link the elements of this relationship. The
nature of the connection is not one of simple
complementarity between individual's interactions (content)
and form. As Simmel (1964:22) pointed out,
However diverse the interests are that give rise 
to...sociations, the forms in which the interests 
are realized may be identical...Hence, not only 
may the form in which the most divergent contents 
are realized be identical; but inversely, the 
content, too, may persist, while its medium— the 
interactions of the individuals adopts a variety 
of forms.
In this case, the process in question is cumulative 
advantage. If anything, this study may show the 
feasibility of the continued use of the subjective 
variables used here, if only to serve the purpose of 
clarifying this continuity. Further, by using these 
variables, perhaps future analyses of cumulative advantage 
will be sensitized by such subjective variables, enabling 
one to test the extent to which the individual, per se, 
contributes to this process.
Regardless of the variables employed, the primary 
findings here suggest that cumulative advantage operates in 
conjunction with the production of articles and with the 
the distribution of resources. These results are the 
strongest findings in support of cumulative advantage. The 
issue might be raised concerning the disparity between
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those faculty members in the natural science discplines and 
those in doctoral granting programs (r=-.598 and .956
respectively). This disparity may be more a function of 
macro (i.e., organizational, institutional) processes 
dealing with the distribution of resources than micro 
processes dealing with individual capabilities.
More generally, it can be tentatively stated that 
cumulative advantage operates more for non-natural science 
respondents than for the natural science respondents. 
Merely looking at the correlations across categories, one
can see a rather strong increase in the negative
correlations from non-natural science respondents to the 
natural science respondents, indicating that while 
cumulative advantage operates within institutional type 
categories, a case must also be made for the operation of 
cumulative advantage across categories, irrespective of 
discipline. Regarding these negative correlations, the 
non-natural science, non-doctoral granting category had the 
fewest with four. Of these four, three were in connection
with the intellectual environment— these were negative in 
all categories. The hypotheses tested here were not 
supported. Further, the fourth negative correlation in 
this category dealt with graduate teaching, a finding, one 
would expect, that would have little to do with cumulative 
advantage in such institutions. That is, since these
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respondents ostensibly are not involved with graduate 
instruction then no relation should exist between graduate 
teaching and the process of cumulative advantage. The 
third category had about the same response. The natural 
science categories had the most, indicating— on face 
value— the least variability over time, offering support 
for the corollary hypothesis. Further, these correlations 
point to the structural nature of cumulative advantage 
rather than the individual factors that are so frequently 
examined. As Mayhew (1980:339) commented:
If one assumes the structure of society in order 
to examine its impact on the immediate acts, 
thoughts and feelings of individuals, one has 
assumed most of what has to be
explained...(..about 95 percent of the variation 
in human society) in order to study a small part 
of human activity and experience (about 5 
percent— and as such, difficult to distinquish 
from random noise).
In short, using subjective, or individualist variables in
this study has demonstrated that these factors do not lead
us to retain the cumulative advantage hypothesis.
Since most, if not all of the available literature on
cumulative advantage deals with those persons in the
natural sciences, and since the evidence for this has been
fairly consistent, then by extension one is forced to
consider this process across all of academe. If cumulative
advantage has been found to operate via the hard sciences,
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then what of individuals who are not employed at doctoral
granting, natural science institutions? Gross (1980:36)
sheds light on this thought:
Let us not delude ourselves. The conditions for 
genuine basic research in any field exist in only 
a few major universities. Most institutions 
cannot afford professors who work only with 
doctoral candidates. Most colleges cherish those 
few scholars who manage to do impressive original 
work...but the vast majority of professors are 
not given the time or resources to labor at the 
frontier of the profession.(emphasis mine)
As a result of these thoughts, the question arises
concerning cumulative advantage: Are we dealing with a
micro or macro process, or both? It is suggested that we
are dealing with macro processes emanating from structure
and process which in turn impacts upon the individual. We
are dealing with the evanescent schism that distinquishes
between the individual and that individual's society.
Generally, it is contended here that if one is
knowledgeable of the structure of one's society, then the
process emanating from that society will offer indicators
that describe how macro phenomena impact upon the
individual. Consequently, we must address both macro
processes and structures, and the individual at the
aggregate level. Merton and Goldstone saw this need and
raised questions that have been addressed in only a very
few quantitative studies (see Faia,1975). In general
terms, such questions address the reasons behind such
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statements such as Zuckerman's that, "access to resources
... often affects the quality of scientific role
performance, which, in its turn, evokes greater or lesser
rewards" (op. cit.:248).
Consequently, it is suggested that future studies 
concerning cumulative advantage might profit by focusing 
primarily on the question of resources. Without resources, 
professors tend not to produce meaningful empirical 
research. rearch in conjunction with cumulative advantage. 
Concerning outside funding, the correlations of total
grants received and the year in which the Ph.D. was taken 
within the doctoral granting, hard science category 
demonstrates a moderately strong negative correlation 
(r=-.358), while the other three categories all experienced 
some variability in receiving financial aid. This suggests 
that either difficulty in receiving grants is reduced over 
time, that the reputation of an institution or department 
influences the ease with which aid is received, or both. 
Regardless of the explanation, support is given to the 
corollary hypothesis. Further, the last category of 
respondents, in conjunction with difficulty in receiving 
funds (CiHARDSUP), exhibited a moderate negative 
correlation with year the Ph.D. was taken, a finding that 
substantiates, to a degree, the correlation with grants 
received.
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The argument could be made that the institutions at
which the last category's respondents work are the premier
colleges and universities in the country and that their
access to resources are justifiable. This may be the case,
but the matter takes a different tack when one considers
the fact that these institutions are in a distinct minority
of all colleges and universities in this country. The
implications of this fact should be clear in regards to
cumulative advantage.
Focusing primarily on the access to resources rather
than on output places cumulative advantage in a different
perspective. That is, by beginning with the overall
conditions of access to resources, we should be in a
stronger intellectual position to begin analysis of
production and exchange in academic science. Mills
(1971:309) noted that
..there is a refusal to relate...isolated facts 
and fragmentary comments to the institutions of 
society, and to their changes. So there is no 
understanding of the structural realities which 
such facts might reveal, the longer trends of 
which they might be tokens...[I]n this style, 
facts and ideas are isolated, and so the real 
questions are not even raised...
The analysis of differences of scientific productivity may
not be totally characterized by a "refusal to relate
isolated facts", but for the most part, little connection
has been made concerning the differential access of
resources in general and in science in particular
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(Allison,et al.,1982:623). Merton elaborates (1968:443) 
further:
Without deliberate intent on the part of any 
group, the reward system thus influences the 
'class structure' of science by providing a 
stratified distribution of chances, among
scientists, for enlarging their roles as 
investigators. The process provides differential 
access to the means of scientific production.
This becomes all the more important in the
current historical shift from little science to 
big science...There is thus a continuing 
interplay between the status system, based on 
differential life chances, which locates
scientists in differing positions within the 
opportunity structure of science.
It is argued here that cumulative advantage is a 
function of the "differential life chances" of scientists, 
before and during their careers as researchers. And, that 
cumulative advantage is an indicator of macro structure and 
process, which in turn has an impact on the individual 
scientist.
It has been noted that the top colleges and 
universities in this country are a distinct minority. It 
was also pointed out that the prestige of one's training 
prior to beginning one's career plays an important role in 
one's initial placement (Hargens and Hagstrom, 1967). The 
problem can then be dissected into two parts: the training
one receives and the institution where the researcher 
conducts his or her research. The focus here will be on 
the latter.
Numerous scholars of the sociology of science have
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repeatedly pointed out that science is "sharply stratified" 
(Zuckerman, 1977:8; also, Cole and Cole, 1973:400-1, among 
others). The argument may perhaps be raised that this 
stratification is a result of innate characteristics of the 
researcher, that some were born with the capacities to 
consistently produce quality research. This may be true, 
but where is this production carried out? More 
specifically, given that a person has the capacities to 
produce, then to what extent does the institution possess 
the necessary resources that enables this production? As 
Hagstrom (1965:39) pointed out: "Theoretically,
organizational context should directly affect scientists' 
productivity and specify the effects of other variables." 
Further, how are these necessary resources distributed 
among academe? In this regard, Blau (1973:278) has stated 
that
..the allocation of economic resources determines 
the structure of the univeristy and the work 
carried out in it...[and] [t]he allocation of 
economic resources is the undisputed prerogative 
of the board of trustees and the president in big 
universities as well as in small colleges.
Recalling Domhoff's (1967) statement that 
the "control of America's leading universities by members 
of the American business aristocracy is more direct than 
with any other institution they control", it should be no 
small wonder that the correlation of year the Ph.D was 
taken with grants received demonstrated, between
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categories, such wide diversity. That is, the doctoral
granting, natural science respondents represents the 
highest ranked institutions in terms of quality and 
prestige. Because their correlation with grants received 
and year the doctorate was awarded was moderately negative 
(r=-.358), it is suggested that access to resources that 
enables production is not so much a function of scholarly 
excellence at time 1 as it is a function of getting one's 
foot in the door at those institutions that do have 
necessary resources— institutions that are apparently 
favored, such that funding for these institutions is less 
problematic than for the less prestigious institutions. 
Long (1978:905) came to a similar conclusion, remarking 
that "[a]dvantage accumulates not to those who have been 
successful at time 1, but to those who have received the
advantage of a prestigious position for reasons independent 
of their productivity at time 1".
This suggests that structural factors and the 
processes emanating from them bear more directly on
individual characteristics related to that production 
(Reskin, 1977:493). Frankly stated, we must analyze the 
system and not the individual in addressing cumulative 
advantage. Studies on personal characteristics have
consistently lacked explanatory power (Vanfossen,1979: 
124; Mayhew,1980). Since productivity is contingent on
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resources, and since the primary resource is money, we must
also consider the primary source of this money and its
implications for cumulative advantage. According to Smith
and Karlesky (1977: 163), the primary source of funding
for research universities has been the various agencies of
the federal government, followed by the universities
themselves. Generally, it can be said that:
The federal government now accounts for the 
two-thirds of the funds spent for research and 
development in universities. The next largest 
contributors are the institutions themselves, 
followed by state governments. Industry and 
private foundations combined account for well 
under 10 percent of the total...
[Ujniversity-based scientific research now 
depends on annual appropriations from the federal 
government for its sustenance (Rosenzweig and 
Turlington,1982: 46-7).
The general findings on the future distribution of
these funds, particularly federal funds, suggests that 
although funding will not radically decrease, the
distribution will be skewed in favor of first rank 
departments and institutions. That is, funding of these 
institutions is a reflection of the nature of the
inequality that exists within our society. Those who 
control a preponderance of the wealth in our society will 
in turn continue to receive more wealth over and above
those who have little or no wealth. The connection to 
cumulative advantage should be clear and should, to at 
least some extent, mirror the pattern of correlations in
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this study. That is, though variability will be relatively
high for research and resources within categories,
disparities between categories should, over time, increase
with doctoral granting and natural science departments
receiving the lion's share. Generally, the prominence of
an institution will determine the resources it receives,
now and in the future. Unless alternative means of support
are found, or unless there is a redistribution of
resources, the process of cumulative advantage will result
in only a very few producers of high quality research.
Either way, "second-rank" departments and institutions and
the scope and breadth of their research will suffer. As
Rosenzweig and Turlington (Ibid.:229) write:
By most measures...the most serious impact of 
recent trends has been felt in second-rank 
departments and institutions. In contrast, the 
leading science departments have tended to retain 
their scientific eminence and their relative 
strength...[T]he signs are sufficiently clear to 
warrant the conclusion that a very rapid 
deterioration in the relative position of many 
weaker departments could well occur in the near 
future...The realities of modern science...also 
create strong pressures on the system to have 
fewer departments fully prepared to conduct 
research of the highest quality.
These authors go on to add that a ripple effect may occur,
negatively affecting even the top flight institutions
(Ibid.:230).
Therefore, it is tentatively concluded that the 
systemic forces, i.e., structure and process of the society
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generally, will influence the process above and beyond the
individuals caught up in that process. That is, it is
believed that cumulative advantage is not set off by
individuals and any innate capacity to do research. Innate
capacity should be a given, Nobel laureates aside. As Faia
(1975:829) concluded in his study:
..we are not confined to the analysis of 
individuals as the unit of observation, and 
future studies of...[cumulative advantage] should 
examine the possibility that organizations such 
as universities and research insitutions may 
receive rewards based less on performance than 
repute...[T]hey are not subject to an inevitable 
mortality, and therefore...[cumulative
advantage], over time, could generate an
extremely intense concentration of rewards [and 
resources].
The findings of this study, owing to the nature of the 
data source, are vague. We are left with only a set of
correlations that attempt to demonstrate the existence of 
cumulative advantage and those factors that tie in with 
that process. Aside from the findings that deal with
publications, there is no clear indication of those factors 
that contribute to cumulative advantage— one can only
infer. But since there appears to be no consensus among 
those who study cumulative advantage, implications of the 
findings are in order.
The most significant implication deals with the level 
of analysis. Virtually all of the research on cumulative 
advantage has dealt with individuals, i.e., certification,
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initial professional placement, colleagues, etc. Few, if 
any, have dealt with structural, or organizational factors 
and how those factors may influence who produces what. 
Few, if any, have dealt with the general social context and 
how that context may influence the distribution of 
resources. If most of us are born with intelligence and 
broad creative capabilities, why is it that those 
capabilities are, to one extent or another, mummified? As 
Storer (1966:73) pointed out. "...creativity is inevitably 
a social as well as a psychological process". The social 
forces that differentiate us from one another in early 
socialization must, by extension, differentiate those of us 
who enter the academic profession. And, at the same time, 
differentiate the organizations— simple or complex— that 
socialize us.
If we are to understand inequalities within academia, 
then inequality in society generally should be addressed. 
Likewise, coming to an understanding of the inequalities 
within academic science should further clarify our 
understanding of inequality in society generally. If the 
concept of cumulative advantage was anticipated by St. 
Matthew, then it should hold that inequality in human 
societies is an omnipresent characteristic of those 
societies— past, present and future. But if we are to 
address the ramifications of that inequality, e.g.,
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cumulative advantage, we must first understand how that 
inequaltiy emerges. It seems that there has been a failure 
to consider the emergence of inequality such that we are 
unable to specify why and for what reasons it emerges, and 
who is affected and to what extent social change is 
impacted by this process. Before specific examples of 
inequality are scrutinized, we must first, in the 
meanwhile, unravel the underpinnings of the emergence of 
inequality.
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Appendix A
COMPUTE GRANTS=0
IF (SUPFED EQ 1)GRANTS=GRANTS+1
IF (SUPSTATE EQ 1)GRANTS=GRANTS+1
IF (SUPFOUND EQ 1)GRANTS=GRANTS+l
IF (SUPINDUS EQ 1)GRANTS=GRANTS+l
** * * * *
SUPFED, SUPSTATE, SUPFOUND and SUPINDUS indicate aid from 
federal, state, private and industrial sources respectively.
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APPENDIX B
(FIELD EQ 2 OR FIELD EQ 8)NATSCI=1
(DEGREEYR EQ 1 AND DOCUNIV EQ 0 AND NATSCI EQ 0)
LATEPUBL ARTPUBL STRESRES PRECISE POORQUAL INTTCH HARDSUP DEPREP 
WORK INTEL BIGRSRCH
(DEGREEYR EQ 2 AND DOCUNIV EQ 0 AND NATSCI EQ 0)
LATEPUBL ARTPUBL STRESRES PRECISE POORQUAL INTTCH HARDSUP DEPREP 
WORK INTEL BIGRSRCH
(DEGREEYR EQ 3 AND DOCUNIV EQ 0 AND NATSCI EQ 0)
LATEPUBL ARTPUBL STRESRES PRECISE POORQUAL INTTCH HARDSUP DEPREP 
WORK INTEL BIGRSRCH
(DEGREEYR EQ 4 AND DOCUNIV EQ 0 AND NATSCI EQ 0)
LATEPUBL ARTPUBL STRESRES PRECISE POORQUAL INTTCH HARDSUP DEPREP 
WORK INTEL BIGRSRCH
(DEGREEYR EQ 5 AND DOCUNIV EQ 0 AND NATSCI EQ 0)
LATEPUBL ARTPUBL STRESRES PRECISE POORQUAL INTTCH HARDSUP DEPREP 
WORK INTEL BIGRSRCH
(DEGREEYR EQ 6 AND DOCUNIV EQ 0 AND NATSCI EQ 0)
LATEPUBL ARTPUBL STRESRES PRECISE POORQUAL INTTCH HARDSUP DEPREP 
WORK INTEL BIGRSRCH
(DEGREEYR EQ 7 AND DOCUNIV EQ 0 AND NATSCI EQ 0)
LATEPUBL ARTPUBL STRESRES PRECISE POORQUAL INTTCH HARDSUP DEPREP 
WORK INTEL BIGRSRCH
(DEGREEYR EQ 8 AND DOCUNIV EQ 0 AND NATSCI EQ 0)
LATEPUBL ARTPUBL STRESRES PRECISE POORQUAL INTTCH HARDSUP DEPREP 
WORK INTEL BIGRSRCH
(DEGREEYR EQ 9 AND DOCUNIV EQ 0 AND NATSCI EQ 0)
LATEPUBL ARTPUBL STRESRES PRECISE POORQUAL INTTCH HARDSUP DEPREP 
WORK INTEL BIGRSRCH
(DEGREEYR EQ 10 AND DOCUNIV EQ 0 AND NATSCI EQ 0)
LATEPUBL ARTPUBL STRESRES PRECISE POORQUAL INTTCH HARDSUP DEPREP 
WORK INTEL BIGRSRCH
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APPENDIX C
0
Research Uni varsities I—the 50 leading universities in terms o f federal financial 
support o f academic science in at least two of the three academic years, 1568 -1060 , 
106 9 -1970 , and 19 7 0 -1 9 7 1 , provided they awarded at least 50  Ph.Os (plus M .O is if a 
medical school was on the same campus) in 196 9 -1970 .
Research Universities It—these universities w ere on the list o f the 100 leading 
institutions in terms of federal financial support in at least tw o ou t of the above three 
years and awarded at least 50 Ph.Os (plus M.O.S if. a medical school was on tne same 
campus) in 1969 -1970 , or they w ere among the leading 50 institutions in term s of 
the total num ber o f Ph.Ds (plus M.O.S if on the same campus) awarded during the  
years from 196 0-1961  to 19 6 9 -1 9 7 0 . In add ition , a few institutions that did' not 
quite meet these criteria, O ut that have graduate programs o f  high quality and w ith  
impressive promise fo r fu tu re  developm ent, have been included in 1.2.
O octoral-G ranting Universities I—these institutions awarded 40 or more Ph.Os in 
1969 -1970  (plus M.O.S if on the same campus) or received at least $3 m illion in total 
federal financial support in either 1969-1970  or 197 0 -1971 . N o institution is 
included that gran ted fewer than 20 Ph.O,s (plus M .D .s if  on the same campus), 
regardless of the am ount o f federal financial support it received.
Ooctoral-G ranting Universities i t—these institutions awarded at least 10 Ph.Os in 
1969 -1970 , w ith  the exception of a few new doctoral-gran ting institutions that m ay  
be expected to  increase the num ber of Pn.Qs awarded w ith in  a few  years.
Comprehensive Universities and College* I—this group includes institutions that 
offered a liberal arts program as well as several other programs, such as engineering 
and business adm inistration. M any of them offered master's degrees, but all tacked a 
doctoral program or had an extrem ely lim ited doctoral program. A ll institutions in 
this group had at least tw o professional or occupational programs and enrolled at 
feast 2 ,000  students in 1970 . If an institution's enrollm ent was smaller than this, it 
was not considered comprehensive.
Comprehensive Universities and Colleges I I—this list includes state colleges and 
some private colleges that offered a liberal arts program and at least one professional
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0100 1684 0981 2469 3500 3677 0422
0100 2120 0669 2912 0902 2460 0728
0100 5301 8694 8909 3376
0200 1424 0780 2414 2510 3738 0370
0200 2181 0531 2564 0846 2575 0531
0200 5152 4872 8343 3786
0300 1461 0657 2590 2690 3740 0496
0300 2087 0490 2831 1036 2476 0605
0300 5085 5352 8973 2511
0400 1418 0587 2256 2424 3724 0384
0400 2023 0604 2975 0920 2590 0672
0400 4888 6415 8716 3505
0500 1547 0802 2461 2813 3690 0472
0500 2028 0609 2861 0870 2471 0586
0500 4873 6275 8817 3156
0600 1502 0760 2463 2549 3717 0426
0600 2111 0662 2861 0859 2570 0558
0600 5034 6120 8690 3468
0700 1475 0673 2196 2020 3739 0337
0700 2196 0648 2860 0862 2621 0605
0700 5055 5683 8677 3798
0800 1554 0751 2014 1756 3708 0382
0800 2219 0672 2883 0856 2696 0634
0800 4833 5800 8774 3508
0900 1559 0734 1844 1312 3682 0430
0900 2316 0706 2926 0872 2727 0641
0900 4859 5691 8930 3536
1000 1491 0600 1619 0867 3683 0419
1000 2407 0744 2865 0886 2757 0638
1000 4874 5718 8979 3211
2712
2062
0727
0628
5725
0221
1700
0448
3410
4900
0446
7000
2382
2353
1023
0756
2762
2125
0932
0737
5549
0130
2620
0272
3469
6375
0488
6554
2129
2259
0881
0739
2756
2061
1017
0679
5496
0108
1963
0172
3551
5587
0434
8835
1938
2251
0848
0503
2735
2085
1016
0699
5665
0135
2172
0209
3541
5702
0435
6385
2001
2335
0849
0715
2735
2145
0892
0693
5632
0130
1844
0246
3493
6061
0495
6043
2058
2323
0812
0580
2804
2185
0834
0719
5706
0125
1644
0191
3464
5736
0509
6918
2000
2333
0681
0601
2901
2168
0816
0680
5687
0148
1629
0223
3454
5399
0491
5708
2015
2391
0808
0685
2869
2112
0786
0620
5729
0148
1665
0210
3405
4952
0510
4093
2049
2411
0741
0659
2832
2153
0776
0635
5729
0179
1500
0249
3288
4146
0581
3069
2044
2468
0772
0724
2779
2192
0820
0590
5709
0159
1501
0225
3236
3708
0589
2774
2085
2539
0785
0726
The first two columns represent the category in which the Ph.D was 
taken— one being the oldest and ten the most recent* The third and fourth
columns represent the type of respondent institution— a one in both columns 
indicates natural science and doctoral granting institutions respectively. 
Beginning in column six, the next four numbers are the mean responses of the 
first variable; the second set of numbers beginning in column eleven are the 
variances for the first variable. This pattern is repeated for the 
remaining variables.
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0110 2652 1811 4362 3439 3007 0911 2945 0834 2091 0701 2877 0863 1832 0854
0110 1891 0666 2884 0976 2180 0668 2225 0882 0696 0875 6610 7503 2102 0782
0110 7613 3363 8493 1630
0210 2504 1581 4406 3530 3121 0993 2629 0906 1947 0717 2764 0765 2038 0869
0210 1813 0574 2665 1031 2056 0565 2222 0724 0466 0544 7649 7459 2068 0584
0210 7187 5662 7736 3653
0310 2344 1452 4276 3507 3173 0906 2776 0929 2006 0694 2887 0757 1867 0672
0310 1951 0607 2683 0906 2124 0587 2179 0805 0470 0613 7793 5468 2169 0520
0310 6772 6503 7832 4023
0410 2409 1508 4268 3382 3154 0870 2713 0852 2080 0750 2921 0760 1844 0680
0410 1974 0692 2618 0954 2208 0641 2293 0773 0597 0841 7472 4942 2308 0676
0410 7076 5939 7904 3425
0510 24.02 1383 4356 3028 3125 0877 2775 0771 2114 0755 2842 0801 1758 0666
0510 1974 0608 2780 0809 2217 0635 2224 0742 0585 0807 7816 4432 2274 0664
0510 7041 5409 8050 3565
0610 2565 1566 4305 2948 3182 0778 2752 0749 2171 0723 2752 0702 1848 0688
0610 2019 0617 2768 0868 2274 0584 2288 0790 0655 0761 7650 4571 2281 0671
0610 7126 5146 7905 3444
0710 2567 1458 4137 2960 3227 0781 2716 0779 2171 0768 2702 0759 1882 0743
0710 2050 0679 2771 0855 2297 0652 2260 0744 0709 0905 6949 4234 2327 0751
0701 7148 5556 7815 4112
0810 2476 1349 3558 2794 3108 0878 2709 0811 2247 0771 2701 0748 1873 0717
0810 2162 0677 2810 0886 2412 0665 2265 0778 0661 0776 5808 3547 2402 0780
0810 6894 5787 7879 3640
0910 2450 1298 3009 2279 3096 0882 2714 0819 2323 0800 2706 0701 1916 0693
0910 2278 0698 2812 0885 2472 0706 2246 0734 0581 0704 4727 2270 2461 0750
0901 6667 5693 8067 3745
1010 207 9 1063 2250 1548 3094 0913 2674 0821 2330 0909 2713 0673 1934 0756
1010 2291 0774 2794 0885 2431 0697 2254 0708 0445 0568 4104 1862 2438 0772
1010 6485 5494 8214 4012
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0101 1165 0560 1832 1864
0101 2055 0055 3478 0446
0101 5226 8905 9851 0330
0201 1656 0563 3753 3371
0201 2108 0492 2706 1052
0201 4938 4410 9508 1366
0301 1447 0692 3038 3682
0301 2110 0637 3040 07 37
0301 4736 5848 9377 1931
0401 1465 0666 2749 3197
0401 2051 0597 2731 0926
0401 4382 4707 9039 2281
0501 1549 0766 3205 3365
0501 2094 0497 2883 1046
0501 4741 5312 9059 2824
0601 1615 1014 3187 3341
0601 2130 0523 2949 0792
0601 4845 6183 8917 2853
0701 1559 07 90 2783 2815
0701 2388 0670 2973 0778
0701 4248 4169 9113 2507
0801 1603 0715 2481 2286
0801 2309 0602 2977 0773
0801 4067 4291 9251 2152
0901 1720 0797 2387 1754
0901 2511 0791 2989 0762
0901 4070 4226 9389 1931
1001 1635 0716 1921 1132
1001 2566 0871 2876 0886
1001 3973 3760 9416 1866
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3830
2269
0170
0676
2600
2569
0489
0486
5988
0037
3771
2402
0284
0371
2095
2140
0591
0746
5848
0103
3571
2381
0586
0492
2134
2217
0777
0493
5513
0284
3601
2502
0734
0500
2182
2193
0750
0619
5681
0160
3576
2681
0634
0526
2285
2332
0962
0760
5428
0286
3626
2654
0552
0606
237 5 
2347
0854
0714
5234
0369
3728
2760
0346
0575
2440
2306
0763
0646
5585
0264
3757
2766
0328
0531
2348
2272
0751
0671
5755
0272
3733
2833
0355
0530
2489
2336
0785
0602
5762
0301
3636
2750
0532
0627
2412
2335
0770
0628
5761
0235
1393
0038
3293
3723
0524
7766
1488
1977
0529
0409
1141
0199
3309
5620
0797
7804
1642
2254
0478
0346
2244
0587
3426
7108
0536
4710
1750
2111
0623
0648
1822
0183
3499
7082
0430
5290
1680
2156
0500
0702
2323
0425
3341
6851
0581
4890
1683
2222
0609
0559
2244
0528
3372
6708
0614
4979
1669
2282
0588
0616
1749
0383
3392
5944
0566
3051
1616
2383
0469
0600
1586
0341
3358
5016
0585
3123
1692
2366
0574
0573
1404
0382
3272
4569
0649
2826
1663
2492
0602
0655
1339
0305
3186
3648
0591
2474
1632
2416
0526
0700
0111
0111
0111
0211
0211
0211
0311
0311
0311
0411
0411
0411
0511
0511
0511
0611
0611
0611
0711
0711
0711
0811
0811
0811
0911
0911
0911
1011
1011
1011
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2661 1794 5377 2147 3296 0867 2475
1745 0614 2227 0958 1937 0863 2651
8386 7031 8158 5074
2912 2058 5242 1793 3296 0671 2425
2119 0641 2968 0662 2280 0642 2461
7778 4459 8926 2143
2896 1964 5360 1763 2847 0902 2461
1920 0672 2697 0948 2096 0706 2388
6863 4035 8055 5095
2772 1699 5295 1969 3062 0907 2226
2018 07 02 2530 0700 2316 0794 2403
7225 4676 8050 4337
3110 1616 5511 1148 3047 0905 2435
1993 0698 2640 0859 2281 0718 2584
7450 4841 8265 3546
3056 1463 5427 1221 3139 0823 2586
2071 0661 2715 0824 2380 0637 2590
7568 3953 8148 2961
3148 1297 5308 1193 3107 0914 2480
2110 0626 2781 0834 2373 0660 2529
7458 4452 8091 3250
3115 1272 4866 1602 2973 0862 2426
2240 0684 2815 0878 2411 0708 2523
7653 4079 8393 2842
2980 1284 4138 2042 2926 0890 2399
2286 0777 2745 0826 2474 0757 2389
7432 4238 8528 3092
2664 1179 3108 1878 2865 1025 2397
2313 0943 2805 0874 2463 0891 2384
7245 4185 8722 3343
0764
0803
1887
0738
0779
0395
2249
8618
1147
4582
1479
1748
0272
0817
0844
0964
2021
0929
0633
0732
2402
9075
0873
2249
1501
1987
0419
0586
0782
0811
2021
0695
0831
0737
2484
8647
0694
3065
1560
1908
0584
0727
0774
0833
2105
0811
0753
0621
2346
8516
0773
3825
1595
2026
0653
0569
0902
0897
2072
1188
0820
1078
2252
8672
0757
2969
1626
2176
0630
0720
0777
0925
2106
1024
0861
0814
2264
8129
0540
2937
1617
2173
0625
0643
0783
0904
2123
1173
0857
0791
2266
7336
0581
2478
1633
2140
0639
0652
0782
0957
2099
1122
0830
0842
2095
5658
0636
2162
1600
2221
0584
0753
0775
0797
2166
1052
0893
0869
2144
4521
0621
1297
1620
2312
0544
0838
0791
0930
2203
0765
0930
0709
2223
3692
0529
1182
1630
2342
0666
0865
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COMPUTE
COMPUTE
COMPUTE
COMPUTE
COMPUTE
COMPUTE
COMPUTE
COMPUTE
COMPUTE
COMPUTE
COMPUTE
COMPUTE
COMPUTE
COMPUTE
COMPUTE
COMPUTE
RECODE
(5=6) (4=7)
Appendix F
C :LATPUBL=100*(LATPUBV-LATPUBM)/(LATPUBM**2)
C :ARTPUB=100*(ARTPUBV-ARTPUBM)/(ARTPUBM**2)
C : STRESRCH=100* ( STRRSV-STRRSM) / ( STRRSM**2 )
C:PRECISE=100*(PRECSV-PRECSM)/(PRECSM**2)
C :POORQUAL=100*(POORQV-POORQM)/(POORQM**2)
C :INTTCH=100*(INTTCHV-INTTCHM)/(INTTCHM**2)
C:HARDSUP=100*(HARDSPV-HARDSPM)/(HARDSPM**2)
C :DEPREP=100*(DEPTRV-DEPTRM)/(DEPTRM**2)
C :W ORK= 100* (W ORKV-W ORKM) / (WORKM* *2 )
C :INTEL=100*(INTELV-INTELM)/(INTELM**2)
C :BIGRSRCH=100*(BIGRSCHV-BIGRSCHM)/(BIGRSCHM**2) 
C:GRANTS=100*(GRANT SV-GRANTSM)/(GRANT SM* *2)
C : SALARY= 100* ( S AL ARY V- S ALARYM ) / ( SALARYM**2 )
C:INTENVM=10 0*(INTENVV-INTENVM)/(INTENVM**2)
C:TCHTIME=100*(TCHTIMEV-TCHTIMEM)/(TCHTIMEM**2)
C:GRADTCH=100*(GRADTCHV-GRADTCHM)/(GRADTCHM**2) 
DEGREEYR (10=1) (9=2) (8=3) (7=4) (6=5)
(3=8) (2=9) (1=10)
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